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MIXED SIGNALS AND SUBTLE CUES: JURY
INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT
OF THE JURY FOREPERSON
Andrew Horwitz'
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are falsely accused of a serious crime and that you
are now on trial before a judge and jury. You knew before the trial
began that the judge had a reputation as a "law and order" judge, as a
judge who was not at all receptive to the arguments of most criminal
defense attorneys. You have been watching as the judge and your
attorney have been engaged in what appears to be an adversarial battle
throughout the trial, but you have taken some comfort in the fact that it
will be the jury, not the judge, who will make the factual determinations
with respect to your case. As is typical, you and your attorney are more
comfortable with some of the jurors than with others, but you hope that
one of the jurors in whom you have more faith will become the
foreperson and that he or she will control the deliberation process. You
also hope that some of your less favored jurors may ultimately be
designated as alternate jurors and, therefore, be excluded from the
deliberation process. After the judge has instructed the jury on the law,
much to your surprise, the judge hand-picks one member of the jury to
be the foreperson, exempting that juror from possible designation as an
alternate and effectively guaranteeing that that juror will play a
dominant role in the deliberation process. What is not surprising, from
your point of view, is that the judge has appointed the juror that you and
your attorney-and probably the judge as well -have viewed as the most
antagonistic to the defense. You believe-with some significant
justification-that the judge has inappropriately interfered with the jury's
deliberative process. You also believe-again with some significant
justification-that the judge has violated your right to have a fair and
impartial jury decide the facts of your case. But can these beliefs be
successfully litigated in an appellate court? These are the issues that this
Article seeks to address.
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In any number of jurisdictions across the United States, both state and
federal, it appears to be common practice for the trial judge in a criminal
case to appoint the foreperson of the jury in a nonrandom fashion. In
some jurisdictions, such as Maryland,1 Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island,3 the trial judge is affirmatively required to appoint the foreperson
of the jury. In a number of other jurisdictions judicial appointment of
the foreperson appears to be the common practice,4 while in still others
the practice appears to be permitted, even if not necessarily encouraged.5
Unlike the much more traditional practice of allowing the jury to elect its
own foreperson, judicial appointment of the foreperson is fraught with a
variety of serious infirmities, many of them of constitutional magnitude.
A substantial body of case law and literature-as well as common
sense-tells us that anything that a trial judge says or does during a trial
is likely to be perceived by all of the trial participants, including the
6jurors, as a reflection of the judge's personal views and opinions. While
that reality is essentially unavoidable, it certainly suggests that judicial
influences on the process should be minimized whenever it is practicable
to do so. The mere fact that the judge has appointed a particular juror to
be foreperson has the potential to convey all sorts of messages to the
remaining jurors and to the other trial participants, including that the
judge thinks that this juror's judgment is superior to that of other jurors
or that this juror's views are in accord with those of the judge.7 Beyond
that set of problems is the issue of whether the trial judge, by appointing
the foreperson, who in turn largely controls the dynamics of the jury
1. See MD. R. 4-312(h) (providing that the court "shall designate a juror as
foreman"); see also Fitzwater v. State, 469 A.2d 909, 915 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (noting
the mandatory nature of the rule).
2. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234, § 25 (2000) (providing that the foreperson "shall
be appointed ... by the court"); see also Commonwealth v. Campbell, 474 N.E.2d 1062,
1067 (Mass. 1985) (ruling that permitting the jury to elect its own foreperson was error).
3. See R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 24(d) ("Prior to the time the jury retires to
commence its deliberations, the court shall appoint one (1) of the jurors to act as
foreman."); see also D.R.I. R. 15(e)(3) (providing that "the court will select" the
foreperson).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d 849, 857 (lst Cir. 1990) (taking
"judicial notice that it is customary in the district courts" of the First Circuit for the judge
to appoint the foreperson); State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582, 599 n.9 (Me. 1976) (noting that
the "practice" in Maine is to have "a court-appointed foreman in all criminal trials");
S.C.R. Civ. P. Form 3 (informing prospective jurors in South Carolina that the judge
"appoints one of the jurors to act as foreman").
5. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352. 1361 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that
the claim that trial court's appointment of foreperson was error was "without merit");
State v. Jaroma, 630 A.2d 1173, 1177 (N.H. 1993) (holding that trial court's nonrandom
appointment of foreperson did not "rise[] to the level of a constitutional violation").
6. See infra text accompanying notes 172-82.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 214-22.
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deliberation process,8 has invaded the jury's right to choose its own
leader and its own deliberation dynamics; evidence suggests that the
dynamics of the deliberation process can have a significant impact on the
results.9 After some discussion concerning the pervasiveness of judicial
appointment of the foreperson and some of the apparent justifications
for the practice, the remainder of this Article will be dedicated to an
exploration of legal arguments that the judicial appointment of the
foreperson violates the defendant's right to a trial by a fair and impartial
jury.
II. PERVASIVENESS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
In a significant number of jurisdictions across the United States, judges
routinely appoint one juror to serve as the foreperson of a given jury in a
given criminal case, often in a nonrandom fashion. In a few jurisdictions,
such as my home state of Rhode Island, this practice is affirmatively
required either by statute or by local rule. For example, Rule 24(d) of
the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"Prior to the time the jury retires to commence its deliberations, the
court shall appoint one (1) of the jurors to act as foreman."' In the
federal court, Rule 15(e)(3) of the Local Rules of the U.S. District Court
for the District of Rhode Island provides that the "court will select one of
the jurors to act as foreman."'" A Maryland court rule similarly provides
that the court "shall designate a juror as foreman."' 2 In Massachusetts,
the practice is governed by a section of the Massachusetts General Laws
that provides that, once a jury has been sworn and empanelled, one of
the jurors "shall be appointed foreman by the court."' 3 Pursuant to that
statutory provision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
ruled that it is error for a judge to allow a jury to elect its own
foreperson.14
In a larger number of jurisdictions, where the practice is not
affirmatively required, it nonetheless appears to be common practice for
the trial judge to appoint a foreperson rather than allow the jury to elect
its own. The First Circuit, for example, has taken "judicial notice that it
8. See infra text accompanying notes 197-213.
9. Id.
10. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. PRO. 24(d) (emphasis added).
11. D.R.I. R. 15(e)(3) (emphasis added).
12. MD. R. 4-312(h) (emphasis added); see also Fitzwater v. State, 469 A.2d 909, 915
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (noting the mandatory nature of the rule).
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234, § 25 (2000) (emphasis added).
14. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 474 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Mass. 1985). The court held
in that case that this error "must be shown to have prejudiced the defendant before
reversal is required." Id.
2005]
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is customary in the district courts of this circuit for the judge to do so"' 5
and has explicitly upheld the practice. 6 The same is true in Maine, where
the Supreme Judicial Court has noted that it is the "practice" to have "a
court-appointed foreman in all criminal trials."'7 In New Hampshire, in a
case in which the trial judge noted that he had nonrandomly selected the
foreperson in "'virtually every criminal case' over which he had
presided, the supreme court upheld that judge's appointment of the
foreperson over the defendant's objection.'8  A Uniform Juror
Information Pamphlet in South Carolina, the contents of which are
prescribed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, advises prospective
jurors that the "judge appoints one of the jurors to act as foreman.""
And in Arizona, Rule 22.1(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
21explicitly authorizes a trial judge to appoint a foreperson for the jury.
While evidence of the pervasiveness of judicial appointment of the
foreperson is not so difficult to find, any written justification of the
practice is. One U.S. district court magistrate judge has explained that
the person he appoints is "usually someone whom I have observed
paying attention to the evidence, instructions and opening and closing
arguments of counsel.",2' Another trial judge explained his appointment
of the foreperson in a particular case where his doing so was the source
of an objection: "'I chose a person to be foreman who, in my opinion,
15. United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d 849, 857 (1st Cir. 1990); see also United States
v. Bartelho, No. CRIM 95-29-P-H, 2000 WL 761787, at *1 (D. Me. Jan. 3, 2000) (noting
that it is the "custom" in the First Circuit for the trial judge to appoint the foreperson at
the outset of the trial). There is some isolated evidence, however, that the practicc of
judicial appointment is not quite so universal as these opinions suggest. See, e.g., MASS.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., INC., THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT SPEAKS: DISTRICT OF
MASSACHUSETTS § 3.2, at 228-29 (1998) (surveying judges in the U. S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts on how the foreperson is selected, with approximately one-
third of the judges indicating that they allow the jury to elect its own foreperson), available
at WL DCS MA-CLE 186 [hereinafter MCLE, DISTRICT COURT SPEAKS]; Justo Arenas,
Practice in the District of Puerto Rico, in MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., INC.,
FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT exhibit 21B (1998), WL FCL MA-
CLE S-21-i (reprinting a standing order of Judge Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Court
Judge in the District of Puerto Rico, stating that he "usually permits the jurors to select
the foreperson").
16. See Cannon, 903 F.2d at 856-57; United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 956 (1st
Cir. 1989).
17. State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582,599-600 & n.9 (Me. 1976).
18. State v. Jaroma, 630 A.2d 1173. 1177 (N.H. 1993) (quoting the trial judge,
Associate Justice Bruce E. Mohl).
19. S.C.R. Civ. P. 84 & Form 3.
20. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 22.1(a) (providing that, "[a]fter instructing the jury, the court
shall appoint or instruct the jurors to elect a foreman").
21. MCLE, DISTRICT COURT SPEAKS, supra note 15, § 3.2, at 229 (quoting U.S.
Magistrate Judge Charles B. Swartwood of the District of Massachusetts).
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appeared to be most attentive during the evidence, and in the
deliberations is most able to keep the jury in line with the complicated
issues, and I do it purely on a subjective analysis.' 2  These explanations
from the judges would seem to suggest a belief that they are more likely
than the jury to be able to identify the juror who is most able to lead a
productive and efficient deliberation process. Because some judges
make the appointment at the outset of the trial,23 a selection intended to
further the goal of efficiency would necessarily be based on the very
limited information one can glean from the jury selection process 24 and
would quite possibly be premised upon socio-economic, racial, or ethnic
stereotyping. In addition, at least one commentator has suggested that
the judicial appointment of the foreperson is actually counterproductive
to the goal of efficiency, arguing that, if he or she has been elected with
"the support of the majority of jurors, the foreperson is likely to be more
effective in the important role of chair of the deliberations. 2 5 Even if
these judges are correct that they can better identify the juror who would
be an effective leader, it is clear that, as one court put it, their conscious
effort to appoint that person as foreperson constitutes "a deliberate
intention by the trial judge to influence the deliberations of the jury,
2 6
even if the trial judge has no deliberate intent to influence the outcome.
One commentator has suggested that some judges "have taken the
selection [of the foreperson away] from the jury to save time and avert
hurt feelings or disappointment."27  As he goes on to argue, however,
there is more than a little irony in taking an important function away
from the jury on these grounds, for "if we trust the jury with the
responsibility of deciding the case, we should also trust them to select
22. Dorshkind v. Harry N. Koff Agency, 134 Cal. Rptr. 344, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting California Superior Court Judge Raymond R. Roberts).
23, See United States v. Bartelho, No. CRIM 95-29-P-H, 2000 WL 761787, at *1 (D.
Me. Jan. 3, 2000). Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine D.
Brock Hornby has indicated that he routinely chooses the jury foreperson "at the outset of
the trial." Id.; see also Jaroma, 630 A.2d at 1177 (upholding trial judge's selection of the
foreperson prior to the trial); MCLE, DISTRICT COURT SPEAKS, supra note 15, § 3.2, at
229 ("1 choose the foreperson at the outset of the trial." (quoting Chief Judge of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts William G. Young)); id. at 228 ("I select
the foreperson just before the jury is sworn at the beginning of the trial." (quoting Judge
Nathaniel M. Gorton of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts)).
24. See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575, 590 (1991)
(observing that some judges "designate the foreperson.., on the basis of the information
disclosed during voir dire").
25. Id. The opposite may well also be true in many cases because the jurors may give
special deference to a foreperson who carries the stamp of judicial approval, but as will be
developed later in this Article, that dynamic presents many problems of its own. See infra
text accompanying notes 224-32.
26. Dorshkind, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
27. Schwarzer, supra note 24.
20051
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their foreperson. ' '28  The social science research on the subject of the
jury's election of the foreperson strongly suggests that the process is
generally "very brief, with little discussion of individual merit,"2 9 such
that any time saved is likely to be minimal. And there is good reason to
believe that the discrete task of electing a foreperson in a democratic
fashion is a useful first step in creating a productive group dynamic.
One other justification for the practice of judicial selection of the
foreperson appears in the legal literature: that a judge can counteract
societal biases and prejudices that often lead juries to elect as foreperson
the white male of the highest socio-economic status. 30 For example, some
years ago Professor Nancy S. Marder suggested that in "jurisdictions
where the judge selects the foreperson, she should make sure that
women are well represented over time., 31 One can find some support for
this justification in the American Bar Association's Standards for
Criminal Justice, which provides that it is "the responsibility of the trial
judge to attempt to eliminate, both in chambers and in the courtroom,
bias or prejudice due to race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
or sexual orientation., 32 Professor Marder supported her suggestion by
arguing that a female foreperson "is more likely than a male foreperson
to be concerned about the group's interaction and the need for all to
speak and to be heard," and that she will therefore create an
environment in which other women "become more outspoken and
assertive.3 3 While this may well be true, and while the goals that she
seeks to promote may well be noble, a trial judge who acts on this sort of
motive is engaged in a deliberate attempt to influence the deliberations
of the jury. Whether this sort of action on the part of a trial judge can be
reconciled with a criminal defendant's constitutional right to trial by a
fair and impartial jury-a jury that can and will decide the case free from
outside interference or influence -is the subject matter of the remainder
of this Article.
28. Id.
29. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research
on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 696 (2001).
30. The fact that juries tend to behave in this fashion is borne out by social science
research on the foreperson election process. Id.
31. Nancy S. Marder, Note, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J.
593, 609 (1987). The author of this note, then a law student, is now an Associate Professor
of Law at the Chicago-Kent College of Law.
32. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 6-1.6(d) (3d ed. 1999), WL SCJ
6-1.6.
33. Marder, supra note 31, at 610. It may well be that the trial judge in Maynard v.
Readdick, 196 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973), had these objectives in mind when he
"appointed the only female juror as foreman of the jury, rather than allowing the jury to
elect its own foreman," id. at 689.
[Vol. 54:829
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lII. RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY
A. The Origins and Outlines of the Right
Recognizing the value and importance of the right to trial by a fair and
impartial jury, our Nation's Founders inserted language into the U.S.
Constitution, and then again into the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution, explicitly guaranteeing that right in all criminal cases.34 As
the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Duncan v. Louisiana:35
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and
experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against
judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority ...
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge.
In an earlier opinion, Justice Hugo Black had described the right to trial
by jury as "an essential bulwark of civil liberty., 37  But the various
arguments in favor of the right to trial by jury make it clear that the right
is about far more than simply protecting the innocent against tyranny and
corruption. One need explore no further than the opinions of the
Supreme Court to find references to a good number of these arguments.
Perhaps first and foremost, the right encompasses the viewpoint that
the "common sense" evaluation of the evidence by a group of laypersons
may often be preferable to the "professional" evaluation of a trial judge,
or at least that the accused is entitled to reach that conclusion with
34. Article 1II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides: "The Trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Sixth
Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed." Id. amend. VI. Although both of these provisions suggest
that the right to trial by jury applies to all crimes, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
through a long line of cases that the right does not apply in cases charging petty criminal
offenses. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 539, 541 (1989); Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617,
624-25 (1937).
35. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
36. Id. at 156.
37. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). In the
same opinion, Justice Black quoted Thomas Jefferson's view that the right to trial by jury
is "'the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the
principles of its constitution."' Id. at 397 n.1 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 71 (Washington ed.)).
2005]
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respect to his or her case. As the Court noted in Williams v. Florida,38
"[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a
group of laymen. 39  That "commonsense judgment of a group of
laymen," the Court later explained, acts as a "hedge against the
overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional
or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge."4  Thus,
having a group of untrained decision-makers-in part but not exclusively
for reasons of independence-has inherent value.
Part and parcel of the recognition of the inherent value of the group of
laypersons is the viewpoint that the group of laypersons, more than a
single appointed or elected judge, will be representative of community
values. A verdict rendered by an impartial jury should generally carry
more moral force and legitimacy with the trial participants and in the
community precisely because it comes from a fair cross section of that
community rather than from one government official. The Supreme
Court has recognized this virtue of the right to trial by jury in any
number of opinions, suggesting that the process of jury deliberation
incorporates "community participation and shared responsibility '4' and
that a jury verdict represents "the commonsense judgment of the
community."4 2 In Witherspoon v. Illinois,3 the Court stated that "one of
the most important functions any jury can perform ... is to maintain a
link between contemporary community values and the penal system."'
While related to the notion that a jury serves to protect against
governmental corruption or tyranny, the Court has recognized that the
jury serves a community function above and beyond that role.
The right to trial by jury also draws strength from the viewpoint that
there is inherent value in having more than one decision-maker. Having
more decision-makers, particularly if they are representative of a fair
cross-section of the community, ensures a broader diversity of
perspectives and, therefore, suggests a more reliable result. The
38. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
39. Id. at 100.
40. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). Similarly, in Duncan, the Court
restated the view of the Framers that if the accused "preferred the common-sense
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single
judge, he was to have it." 391 U.S. at 156.
41. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
42. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
43. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
44. Id. at 519 n.15; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (expressing the view that only a jury and not a judge should be permitted to
impose a death sentence because a jury is "better able to determine in the particular case
the need for retribution").
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Supreme Court held in Ballew v. Georgia45 that having a jury that consists
of fewer than six persons violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment rightby. 46to be tried by a jury. Taken in conjunction with the general
requirement of jury unanimity in a criminal case,47 it becomes clear that
the size of the jury, in and of itself, is viewed as having inherent value.
Indeed, the underlying premise of our adversarial system of adjudication
appears to be that "an impartial jury-valued because of its size, breadth
of experience, and especially its independence-can and should decide
the case.,
48
B. The Right To Have the Jury, Not the Judge, Make Findings of Fact
In a recent line of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of
decisions that vigorously protect a defendant's right to have critical
factual determinations made by a jury, not a judge. In 1999, the Court in
Jones v. United States49 reversed a defendant's conviction for carjacking,
holding that the federal statute that created the offense had been
wrongly interpreted by the lower courts.50 In essence the Court held that
because the maximum sentence permitted under the statute was
determined by certain factual findings, those factual findings must be
viewed as elements of the offense and, therefore, must be determined by
the jury." In reaching its decision, the majority summarized the
historical origins of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, noting
that this particular right, perhaps more than many others found in the
U.S. Constitution, must be guarded against all incursions." As the Court
noted, "Americans of the [colonial] period perfectly well understood the
lesson that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by
erosion."53
The following Term, in the landmark case of Apprendi v. New Jersey,
54
the Court solidified its commitment to the principles enunciated in Jones.
In Apprendi, the Court struck down a New Jersey statute that allowed a
45. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
46. Id. at 243-45.
47. In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion), the U.S. Supreme
Court held that jury unanimity was not constitutionally required in criminal cases, id. at
406. Nonetheless, the majority of jurisdictions in the United States continue to require a
unanimous verdict in a criminal case.
48. Steven A. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial
Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 29 (1978).
49. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
50. Id. at 251-52.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 244-48.
53. Id. at 248.
54. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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judge to impose a sentence above and beyond the statutory maximum for
the underlying crime when the judge, not the jury, found that the
defendant's purpose was to intimidate his or her victim based on the
victim's personal characteristics.5 1 Once again, the Court emphasized the
critical nature of the right to jury trial, holding that the New Jersey
procedure was "an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is
an indispensable part of our criminal justice system., 56
Two years later, in 2002, the Court yet again enforced its restrictive
protection of the right to jury trial. In Ring v. Arizona,57 the Court struck
down Arizona's death penalty statute because it delegated to a judge the
power to determine the factors necessary for the imposition of a death
sentence. In response to the state's argument that judges may be a
better guard against arbitrariness than juries, the Court effectively
summarized the heart of its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence in this area:
The Sixth Amendment jury trial right ... does not turn on the
relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential
factfinders. Entrusting to a judge the finding of facts necessary
to support a death sentence might be "an admirably fair and
efficient scheme of criminal justice designed for a society that is
prepared to leave criminal justice to the State.... The founders
of the American Republic were not prepared to leave it to the
State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least
controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been
efficient; but it has always been free." 59
60Most recently, in Blakely v. Washington, the Court steadfastly
maintained the same course. The consequence of the failure to properly
delegate a finding of fact to the jury, as all of these Supreme Court cases
make clear, is that a resulting conviction or sentence has been obtained
in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and
must be vacated.
C. The Right To Have the Jury Make Findings of Fact Without Influence
from External Sources
The constitutional right to have the facts of a case decided by a jury
incorporates the right to have that jury decide those facts without
interference or intrusion from outside forces. As the U.S. Supreme
55. Id. at 497.
56. Id.
57. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
58. Id. at 609.
59. Id. at 607 (second omission in original) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
60. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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61Court noted in Turner v. Louisiana, in which the Court reversed a
conviction because of contact between trial witnesses and the jurors,
"[t]he requirement that a jury's verdict 'must be based on the evidence
developed at the trial' goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is
embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury."62  For that
reason, juries are sternly and repeatedly instructed concerning each
juror's obligation to have no contact with any persons involved in the
trial, to have no conversations of any kind with anyone about the trial,
and to avoid hearing about or reading about the trial in the media.63 In
some cases, the jurors are sequestered during the trial in order to prevent
outside interference, intrusion, or influence; in a much higher percentage
of cases, the. jurors are sequestered during their deliberations for
precisely the same reason. 4 The case law that requires that those
instructions be given, and the case law dealing with situations in which
jurors are found to have violated those instructions, reveal the level upon
which the sanctity and purity of the jury's information-gathering and
deliberative functions are protected.
In some settings, the mere possibility of improper interference,
intrusion, or influence in a jury's fact-finding role requires a court to
presume that a criminal defendant has been prejudiced. Once a verdict
has been reached, clearly established court rules absolutely prohibit
testimony from a juror about the deliberative process or about the extent
to which outside interference, intrusion, or influence may have altered
the way he or she, or the jury as a whole, viewed the case. 6' For that
reason, the absence of prejudice in this sort of situation is virtually
unprovable and, therefore, the court's determination that prejudice will
be presumed is generally dispositive of the case.
Over a century ago, in Mattox v. United States,6 the United States
Supreme Court established the core constitutional principles and
jurisprudence in this area of law. In that case, a deliberating jury had
been exposed to comments about the case and the defendant by a bailiff
67as well as to a newspaper article concerning the case. The Court
declared, "It is vital in capital cases that the jury should pass upon the
case free from external causes tending to disturb the exercise of
deliberate and unbiased judgment. Nor can any ground of suspicion that
61. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
62. Id. at 472 (discussing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)).
63. See, e.g., 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 1.9 (2003).
64. See Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 63 (1996).
65. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892); FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
66. 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
67. Id. at 147.
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the administration of justice has been interfered with be tolerated."6 In
order to protect those core principles, the Court set out the general rule:
"Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third
persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden,
and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to
appear., 69 Because the government could not meet that heavy burden in
that case, the Court overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial .7
The Supreme Court reconfirmed its commitment to this jurisprudence
in Remmer v. United States,7' decided in 1954. In Remmer, an unknown
person had approached a juror during the trial and told him that the
juror could profit by bringing in a verdict for the defense, leading to an
investigation and interview of that juror by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. 2  Citing Mattox, the Court framed its legal analysis as
follows:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or
tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial
about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious
reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial . . . . The
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily
upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing
of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless
to the defendant.73
Stressing the core principle that the "integrity of jury proceedings must
not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions," the Court remanded the
case to the trial court for a hearing to determine the presence or absence
of prejudice 4
Since it decided Remmer, the Supreme Court has presumed prejudice
in a handful of other cases involving outside interference with the jury.
In Turner v. Louisiana,75 for example, the Court overturned a conviction
when two of the deputy sheriffs charged with supervising and escorting
the sequestered jury were also central witnesses for the government at
the trial. Although there was no evidence to suggest that the sheriffs
discussed the case with the jurors, the Court found that "it would be
blinking reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in this
continual association throughout the trial between the jurors and these
68. Id. at 149.
69. Id. at 150.
70. Id. at 149-53.
71. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
72. Id. at 228.
73. Id. at 229.
74. Id. at 229-30.
75. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
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two key witnesses for the prosecution. 7 6 The Court summarized its
holding in the following terms:
It would have undermined the basic guarantees of a trial by
jury to permit this kind of an association between the jurors and
two key prosecution witnesses who were not deputy sheriffs.
But the role that [the two witnesses] played as deputies made
the association even more prejudicial. For the relationship was
one which could not but foster the jurors' confidence in those
who were their official guardians during the entire period of the
trial."
Similarly, in Parker v. Gladden8 the Court overturned a conviction
when evidence was adduced that a bailiff assigned to shepherd the
sequestered jury told one juror that he thought the defendant was guilty
and told another juror that any error in convicting the defendant would
be corrected by the Supreme Court.7 9 As in Turner, the Court stressed
that "the official character of the bailiff-as an officer of the court as well
as the State-beyond question carries great weight with a jury."80 The
Court found that the "unauthorized conduct of the bailiff 'involves such a
probability that prejudice will result"' that it would constitute a per se
violation of the Sixth Amendment even in the absence of direct evidence
• - 81
of prejudice.
In the lower courts, a presumption of prejudice has been imposed in a
variety of settings beyond those involving juror contact with court
personnel or media accounts, highlighting the lengths to which the right
to have a jury free from outside influence or interference will be
protected. In United States v. Williams,82 for example, the Eighth Circuit
reversed a criminal conviction solely because the trial judge failed to
instruct- the jurors about their obligation to avoid outside influences
before he allowed the jury to separate for the evening.83 Even though
there was no showing of "actual prejudice," the court reversed the
conviction because the "danger that a wife or husband or other family
members could make innocent suggestions during the evening
concerning the case or criminal trials in general [was] too serious to be
76. Id. at 473.
77. Id. at 474.
78. 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (per curiam).
79. Id. at 363-64.
80. Id. at 365.
81. Id. (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965)).
82. 635 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1980).
83. Id. at 744.
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overlooked."8 Without explicitly mentioning the right to a jury trial, the
court firmly rooted its opinion in constitutional language:
It is essential to a fair trial, civil or criminal, that a jury be
cautioned as to permissible conduct and conversations outside
the jury room. Such an admonition is particularly needed
before a jury separates at night when they will converse with
friends and relatives or perhaps encounter newspaper or
television coverage of the trial. It is fundamental that a jury be
cautioned from the beginning of a trial and generally
throughout to keep their considerations confidential and to
avoid wrongful and often subtle suggestions offered by
outsiders.8
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has likewise held
that a trial court's failure to "admonish the jurors not to discuss the case
with any other person until they have rendered a verdict" is a clear
86
violation of the constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.
Another line of lower court cases, dealing with alternate jurors, serves
to illustrate the importance courts have attached to the right to a jury
free from outside interference or influence. In the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions, the mere presence of an alternate juror at or
after the moment at which deliberations begin constitutes a violation of
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury trial and
requires a new trial.87  For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Sheehy, 8 reversed a murder
conviction when three alternate jurors sat in the jury room during the
jury's deliberations. As the court explained:
"Proper respect for the right to jury trial . . . dictates judicial
vigilance to ensure, in so far as reasonably possible, that jury
deliberations are conducted privately and without extraneous
influence." . . . The alternate jurors, whose own views may be
influenced by their lack of responsibility for the verdict, may
influence the jurors. Even if the alternates do not speak, their
presence alone might inhibit some jurors from speaking freely.
84. Id. at 746.
85. Id. at 745-46.
86. United States v. Richardson, 817 F.2d 886, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Coppedge
v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).
87. State v. Bindyke, 220 S.E.2d 521, 531 (N.C. 1975) (noting that the "overwhelming
majority of the decided cases" hold that the presence of an alternate juror during
deliberations "is a fundamental irregularity of constitutional proportions which requires a
mistrial or vitiates a verdict, if rendered"); Michelle M. Gee, Annotation, Presence of
Alternate Juror in Jury Room as Ground for Reversal of State Criminal Conviction, 15
A.L.R. 4TH 1127 (1982).
88. 588 N.E.2d 10 (Mass. 1992).
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In order to protect the constitutional right to trial by jury, we
have held that the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room
during deliberations is an intolerable invasion of the jury's
privacy that requires reversal. 9
The alternate jurors in that case sat against the wall and did not
participate in the jurors' discussions.?O Although the defendant did not
object to the presence of the alternates, and although the defendant
could not affirmatively establish any prejudice resulting from their
presence, the court nonetheless reversed the conviction on constitutional
grounds." The court explicitly rejected the Commonwealth's argument
that the defendant was not prejudiced by the presence of the alternates,
noting that the Commonwealth could "never prove the lack of prejudice"
when alternates were present during deliberations because "it is
impossible to determine conclusively that their presence, body language,
or facial expressions had no effect on the jury without inquiring into the
subjective mental processes of the jurors, a query we cannot permit., 92
Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State v. Bindyke,93
reversed several felony convictions when an alternate juror "remained in
the jury room from three to four minutes after the jury retired to
consider its verdict. 9 4 Although there was no direct evidence that the
jury had even begun its deliberations, the defendant neither objected nor
moved for a mistrial, and there was no evidence proving that the
defendant was prejudiced, the court decided to "adopt the majority rule
and hold that the presence of an alternate in the jury room during the
jury's deliberations violates [the state constitution] and constitutes
reversible error per se.""5 The court found that the alternate's presence
violated the defendant's right to a trial "by a jury of twelve in the
inviolability, confidentiality, and privacy of the jury room," and that any
effort to determine prejudice would "necessarily be inconclusive" and
would involve further invasion of the jury process.96
In the federal system, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in 1993
concerning alternate jurors in the jury room. In that case, United States
v. Olano,97 the defendant had consented to having two alternate jurors be
89. Id. at 12 (first omission in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 531 N.E.2d
556, 559 (Mass. 1988)).
90. Id. at 10.
91. Id. at 10, 12-13.
92. Id. at 13.
93. 220 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. 1975).
94. Id. at 530, 535.
95. Id. at 531, 533.
96. Id. at 533.
97. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
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present for the jury's deliberation, although the alternates were
instructed not to participate. As the Supreme Court noted, such a
practice was in clear violation of Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which requires that any remaining alternate jurors
"be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict."99  But
because the error was not "brought to the attention of the [trial] court"
through an objection, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure would allow the conviction to be overturned only if the Court
found that the error was one "affect[ing] substantial rights."''0  The
majority opinion in Olano held that "[t]he presence of alternate jurors
during jury deliberations is not the kind of error that 'affect[s] substantial
rights' independent of its prejudicial impact." '° The Court recognized
that, at least in theory, the presence of alternate jurors could influence
the deliberative process either through their direct verbal or nonverbal
participation in the deliberations or through a "chilling" effect on the
regular jurors."2 Nonetheless, because the defendant was unable to show
that he was prejudiced in this fashion, the Court upheld the conviction.03
A vigorous dissent by Justices Stevens, White, and Blackmun argued that
the error did affect substantial rights because it "call[ed] into question
the integrity of the jury's deliberations," and that the Ninth Circuit acted
within its discretionary powers when it reversed the defendant's
conviction.'0 Interestingly, even the Court's majority opinion
highlighted the fact that, had the trial court allowed the alternate jurors
into the jury room over the defendant's objection, the burden would
have been on the government, under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to prove the absence of prejudice,1°5 quite possibly
an insurmountable burden of proof'06
98. Id. at 728.
99. Id. at 737. Rule 24(c) "requires the court to discharge all of the alternate jurors-
who have not been selected to replace other jurors when the jury retires to deliberate."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c).
100. Rule 52(b) provides: "PLAIN ERROR. A plain error that affects substantial
rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention." FED.
R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
101. Olano, 507 U.S. at 737 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
102. Id, at 739.
103. Id. at 741.
104. Id. at 743-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 734.
106. The Court noted that "[w]hether the Government could have met its burden of
showing the absence of prejudice" was not at issue in the case. Id. at 741. Justice
Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, pointed out that a government showing of the absence
of prejudice would be "most difficult" given that the rule banning alternates from the jury
room during deliberation is "based on certain premises about group dynamics that make it
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These lines of cases stand for the proposition that outside interference,
intrusion, or influence in jury deliberations will not be tolerated and that
certain forms of such interference, intrusion, or influence will lead to a
presumption of prejudice that, in actual terms, is virtually impossible to
rebut. If interference, intrusion, or influence from sources with less
power over a jury than the judge presiding over the case can be of
sufficient concern to justify a presumption of prejudice, certainly any risk
of the same conduct by the trial judge should make the case for a
presumption of prejudice that much more appropriate.
D. The Right To Have the Jury Make Findings of Fact Without Influence
from the Judge
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that even when factual
determinations appear to have been properly delegated to the jury, that
delegation can be rendered meaningless if the trial judge makes
comments that might influence the jury's findings. In Hicks v. United
States,0 7 decided in 1893, the Court reversed a defendant's conviction
when the trial judge instructed the jury that the prosecution's witnesses
were "telling the truth" and that the defendant's testimony, which
contradicted that of the prosecution's witnesses, should be viewed in light
of his significant interest in the outcome of the case. °8 The Court noted
that the defendant's right to testify was of little value when the judge, "to
whose lightest word the jury, properly enough, give[s] a great weight,
should intimate that the dreadful condition in which the accused finds
himself should deprive his testimony of probability."'0 9 The Court,
noting that it was "not easy to say what effect this instruction had upon
the jury," reversed the conviction because of the danger that the judge
had influenced the jury's evaluation of the evidence in the case."1
The following Term, the Court once again addressed the possibility
that a judge's comments during the trial could improperly influence the
jury's fact-finding function. In Starr v. United States,"' the Court
reversed a murder conviction because the trial judge made a series of
inflammatory remarks to the jury."' While recognizing that, under
federal law, some judicial comment on the evidence is permitted, the
Court clarified the trial judge's role and obligations in that regard: "As
difficult for us to know how the jury's deliberations may have been affected." Id. at 742
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
107. 150 U.S. 442 (1893).
108. Id. at 450-51, 453.
109. Id. at 452.
110. Id. at 452-53.
111. 153 U.S. 614 (1894).
112. Id. at 625-27.
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the jurors are the triers of facts, expressions of opinion by the court
should be so guarded as to leave the jury free in the exercise of their own
judgments." ' Indeed, the Court suggested that it was "obvious that
under any system of jury trials the influence of the trial judge on the jury
is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his lightest word or
intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling."
1 4
Because the judge's comments in that case "were not consistent with due
regard to the right and duty of the jury to exercise an independent
judgment,1 .5 the Court reversed the conviction.' 6
The common law notion that trial judges should be permitted to
comment upon the evidence adduced at trial, while still a permissible
practice in the federal courts, has been rejected by the vast majority of
statesI1" and is strongly disfavored by the American Bar Association. The
commentary to standard 15-4.2 of the Standards for Criminal Justice
relating to jury trials explains that judicial comment is disfavored out of
"due regard for the respective roles of judge and jury in a criminal trial
and the uniquely influential position of the trial judge."118  The
commentary points out that the "potential for abuse, for
misunderstanding, for judicial usurpation of the jury's function as fact-
finder, and for improperly influencing the jurors is simply too great" for
the practice to be endorsed." 9 For just those reasons, the last vestiges of
the power to comment upon the evidence, even in the federal system,
have been viewed in very narrow terms and abuses have led to frequent
reversals.
121In Moody v. United States, for example, the Fifth Circuit reversed a
conviction after a trial judge commended a witness in his instructions to
the jury for coming to testify against his relative.1 2' The court explained
why the judge's "privilege" to comment upon the evidence has been
"severely restricted":
That a jury is highly sensitive to every judicial utterance is
axiomatic. A judge's words to the jury carry an authority
bordering on the irrefutable. In explaining the law he must
113. Id. at 625.
114. Id. at 626.
115. Id. at 626, 628.
116. Id. at 627.
117. Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 CONN. L.
REV. 243, 253 (2000).
118. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY,
Standard 15-4.2 cmt. (3d ed. 1996).
119. Id.
120. 377 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967).
121. Id. at 178.
[Vol. 54:829
Mixed Signals and Subtle Cues
present all of the relevant alternate routes which the jury may
choose, and in doing so he may, and indeed sometimes he must,
analyze and dissect the evidence to insure that the jury
comprehends its options and their legal effects. But the judge
must take care that the respect or awe which his office
engenders does not tend to persuade or lure the jury to defer to
his apparent experience and wisdom.
2
Emphasizing that "[q]uestions of fact must unmistakably be left to the
jury," the court condemned the trial judge's comments because they
"were readily susceptible of the inference that the defendants were
guilty, and the jury might have concluded that the credibility of the
witnesses was not its problem.",123 Because the court was "not free from
doubt" that the judge's comments "did not have a substantial influence
on the jury," the conviction was reversed. 2 4
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has expressed
similar views concerning the limitations on the right to comment. In
125Billeci v. United States, the court explained the law regarding the
practice in this way:
The accused has a right to a trial by the jury. That means that
his guilt or innocence must be decided by twelve laymen and
not by the one judge. A judge cannot impinge upon that right
any more than he can destroy it. He cannot press upon the jury
the weight of his influence any more than he can eliminate the
jury altogether. It is for this reason that courts have held time
and again that a trial judge cannot be argumentative in his
comments; he cannot be an advocate; he cannot urge his own
126
view of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The court wrote that "the trial court may not do by indirection that
which it may not do directly; that it may not coerce, or attempt to coerce,
a jury by gesture any more than it may do so by words."' ' Because the
judge in that case said in his charge that he would have instructed the
jury to find the defendant guilty if he were permitted to do so, the court
reversed the conviction."'
Frequently, courts finding abuses of the right to comment have held
that a conviction must be reversed even though the trial court explicitly
instructed the jury that its views were not controlling. In Quercia v.
122 Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
123, Id.
124, Id. at 180-81.
125. 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
126. Id. at 403.
127. Id. at 401.
128. Id. at 400, 403.
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United States,"29 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a criminal
conviction when the judge, in his charge to the jury, commented that the
defendant "wiped his hands during his testimony," that such behavior "is
almost always an indication of lying," and that the judge personally
disbelieved the defendant's testimony. 30 The trial judge specifically
instructed the jury that his opinion "is not binding on you, and if you
don't agree with it, it is your duty to find him not guilty. 1 3' The Supreme
Court held that this instruction did not cure the error, finding that the
judge's "characterization of the manner and testimony of the accused
was of a sort most likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the
jury and to excite a prejudice which would preclude a fair and
dispassionate consideration of the evidence.'
32
Similarly, in United States v. Cisneros,'33 the Fifth Circuit reversed a
criminal conviction in the face of an allegedly curative instruction when
the trial judge told the jurors that they could consider "something that
[the court] noticed" about a witness's interaction with the defendant as
he left the courtroom. 4  The trial judge's comment was "apparently
prompted by his belief that he had seen a signal of encouragement or
acknowledgment passing between" the witness and the defendant as the
witness "left the stand and passed the defense table."'35 After finding
that the "credibility issues before the jury were close, difficult, and
extremely important," the court noted: "In such a case commenting on
the evidence is a perilous endeavor, to be undertaken with caution lest
the slightest suggestion of favor for one side or the other from the
supposedly impartial moderator tip the balance and impel a decision. '
In that case, the court rejected the notion that an instruction on the
proper fact-finding role of the jury was sufficient to save the conviction:
"[T]hough we decline to speculate on the probable efficacy of limiting
instructions as a general matter, we believe that the comments here
challenged were simply too harmful to be cured by the other
instructions."'31 A number of other courts have held the same way."'
Improper judicial interference, intrusion, or influence in the jury's fact-
finding function has also been recognized in cases that do not involve any
129. 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
130. Id. at 468, 472.
131. Id. at 469.
132. Id. at 472.
133. 491 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1974).
134. Id. at 1070, 1072.
135. Id. at 1073.
136. Id. at 1076.
137. Id. at 1075-76 (footnote omitted).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Saenz, 134 F.3d 697, 713 (5th Cir. 1998).
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overt commentary from the trial judge. Most commonly in this regard,
convictions have been reversed because of the manner in which or the
extent to which the trial court has questioned a witness at the trial.
Because of the risk that a jury might read into a judge's questions a
suggestion of the trial judge's views on that witness's testimony, courts
have found that certain forms of judicial questioning violate the
defendant's right to have the jury weigh the evidence and find facts
without interference, intrusion, or influence by the judge. 39
In United States v. Hickman,'4° for example, the Sixth Circuit reversed a
conviction after finding that the trial judge repeatedly injected himself
into the proceedings by questioning witnesses. 141 "The problem," the
court asserted:
[I]s that potential prejudice lurks behind every intrusion into a
trial made by a presiding judge. The reason for this is that a
trial judge's position before a jury is "overpowering." His
position makes "his slightest action of great weight with the
jury."
For this reason, this Circuit has disapproved of extensive
questioning of witnesses by 
a trial judge.4 o2
Because the court there was "convinced that[,] judged as a whole, the
conduct of the trial judge must have left the jury with a strong impression
of the judge's belief of the defendant's probable guilt," it held that the
jury was "unable to freely perform its function of independent fact
finder., 143  The court rejected the government's argument that the
problem was cured by the trial court's instructions to the jury.
1
4
Similarly, in United States v. Bland,45 the Eighth Circuit reversed a
conviction when it found that the trial court had involved itself with
139. A related danger sometimes identified in cases dealing with judicial questioning
of witnesses is that the judge's questions, and the answers to those questions, may take on
disproportionate weight in the eyes of the jurors. The Fifth Circuit has said that "[w]hen a
judge's questions focus on particular portions of a witness's testimony, the jury is likely to
attach more weight to the portions on which the judge's questions focus." Id. at 710. In a
related fashion, answers to a judge's questions may take on added weight in the eyes of the
jury because, as the Third Circuit has noted, "[A] jury might think that a witness would be
more likely to tell the truth to the judge than to counsel." United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d
1090, 1094 (3d Cir. 1983). For these reasons, even in the face of jury instructions telling
the jury that they are the sole finders of fact, courts have reversed convictions in order to
protect the defendant's right to have the jury find facts without judicial intrusion.
140. 592 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979).
141. Id. at 931, 933.
142. Id. at 933 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 936.
144. Id.
145. 697 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1983).
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questioning several witnesses, each time to the benefit of the
prosecution. 46 In explaining its holding, the court stated: "A judge's
slightest indication that he favors the government's case can have an
immeasurable effect upon a jury. A trial judge should seldom intervene
in the questioning of a witness and then only to clarify isolated testimony.
A trial court should never assume the burden of direct or cross-
examination.' ' 147 After the verdict was returned, the trial judge remarked
to the jury that he believed the defendant to be guilty; the appellate court
suggested that, while the judge "did not intend to prejudice the
defendant's trial," his viewpoint "may have unconsciously driven him to
assume a prosecutorial role.',
48
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has more
recently summarized the case law in this area:
District court authority to question witnesses . has limits.
Because juries, not judges, decide whether witnesses are telling
the truth, and because judges wield enormous influence over
juries, judges may not ask questions that signal their belief or
disbelief of witnesses. Because such questions can usurp the
jury's factfinding function, cast the judge in the role of advocate,
and "breach [] the atmosphere of judicial evenhandedness that
should pervade the courtroom," they can deprive defendants of
fair trials. Judges must therefore strive to preserve an
appearance of impartiality and "'err on the side of [a]bstention
from intervention.'"
49
In that case, United States v. Tilghman,5" the court found that "the jury
could reasonably have interpreted the judge's pointed comments," which
were made while the judge was questioning the defendant, "as reflecting
his personal disbelief of [the defendant]."'' Having so found, the court
refused to "speculate about what transpired behind the jury room door"
and reversed the conviction.'52 Like the Sixth Circuit in Hickman and
many other courts before it, the court held that this sort of "interference
with jury fact-finding cannot be cured by standard jury instructions. '
Drawing upon the logical underpinnings of these holdings, courts have
found reversible error even when a judge has neither commented on the
146. Id. at 266.
147. Id. at 265-66 (footnote omitted).
148. Id. at 266.
149. United States v. Tilghman, 134 F.3d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted).
150. 134 F.3d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
151. Id. at 420.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 421 (citing United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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evidence nor intruded into the trial by questioning witnesses. In these
cases, as above, courts have stressed that trial courts must make every
effort to avoid words or actions that the jury could conceivably interpret
as expressing any opinion on the evidence or any partiality to one side.
In People v. Rogers,54 for example, the Colorado Court of Appeals
reversed a conviction for sexual assault on a child solely because the trial
judge personally escorted the child witness to and from the witness
stand.15 The court recognized that the trial judge's intent was to make
the child more comfortable and to "minimize the adverse effects upon
the child," but held that the trial judge's actions required reversal
because the jury "could have perceived the trial court's action as an
endorsement of the child's credibility, thus impinging upon the
defendant's right to a fair trial."' 56 Because a trial court "must be free of
even the appearance of bias and partiality," the court stressed that "trial
courts should scrupulously avoid taking actions that might give an
appearance of partiality.' ' 1 7 Although the trial judge had given a very
explicit instruction concerning her actions, the court nonetheless
reversed, finding that no instruction could "'unring the bell' of prejudice
to the defendant.'
58
In another, much higher profile case from New Jersey, a court reversed
a conviction on several counts of child sexual abuse for quite similar
reasons. In that case, State v. Michaels,59 child witnesses testified to the
jury through the use of closed-circuit television. '6 As the appellate court
explained, the trial judge, "in the televised-view of the jury, played ball
with the children, held them on his lap and knee at times, whispered in
their ears and had them do the same, and encouraged and complimented
them.' 6' As in Rogers, the court recognized that the judge did not
intend to communicate an opinion on the evidence or on the credibility
of the children to the jury.16 Nonetheless, the court reversed due to its
concern that, "after this manner of presentation of testimony from
nineteen children, [] a jury considering a verdict in favor of the defendant
might feel that it was personally offending the judge. The required
atmosphere of the bench's impartiality was lost in this trial.' ' 63 Other
154. 800 P.2d 1327 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
155. Id. at 1328.
156. Id. at 1329.
157. Id. at 1328.
158. Id. at 1329.
159. 625 A.2d 489 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
160. Id. at 492.
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courts have likewise reversed convictions when a trial judge has
rewarded a child witness with candy or other treats in the presence of the
jury. 64
Other forms of nonverbal conduct by a trial judge have been found to
165be reversible error. For example, in Abrams v. State, the Florida
District Court of Appeal reversed a criminal conviction when a trial
judge, at the conclusion of a key witness's testimony, shook hands and
engaged in conversation with that witness in the presence of the jury.1 6
Because the jury could have inferred from the judge's actions that he
believed the witness to be "a very credible, honest witness," the court
found that the trial judge's "inadvertent conduct was prejudicial to the
defendant. '' 117 The court justified its holding by quoting from a case
decided close to a century earlier:
"[G]reat care should always be observed by the judge to avoid
the use of any remark in the hearing of the jury that is capable,
directly or indirectly, expressly, inferentially, or by innuendo, of
conveying any intimation as to what view he takes of the case,
or that intimates his opinion as to the weight, character or
credibility of any evidence adduced. All matters of fact, and all
testimony adduced, should be left to the deliberate,
independent, voluntary, and unbiased judgment of the jury,
wholly uninfluenced by any instruction, remarks or intimation,
either in express terms or by innuendo from the judge, from
which his view of such matters may be discerned. Any other
course deprives the accused of his right to trial by jury, and is
erroneous."
168
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed a conviction
when the trial judge "turned his back to the jury for forty-five minutes
during [the] defendant's testimony on direct examination. 1 69 Noting that
the trial judge "may not have intended to convey such a message," the
court found that the jury could have inferred from the judge's actions
164. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 485 So. 2d 606, 609 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "the
trial judge's decision to reward the child witness with candy in the presence of the jury"
was reversible error because it "could certainly be viewed by the jury as an indirect
comment on this witness' veracity"); State v. R.W., 491 A.2d 1304, 1309 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1985) (holding that rewarding a child witness with ice-cream, cookies, and
candy in the presence of the jury was reversible error and that the error was such that it
"could not be cured by an instruction").
165. 326 So. 2d 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
166. Id. at 212.
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting Lester v. State, 20 So. 232, 234 (Fla. 1896)).
169. State v. Jenkins, 445 S.E.2d 622, 624 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
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that he "did not believe [the] defendant's testimony to be credible., 170
As the court explained, trial judges
"must be careful in what they say and do because a jury looks to
the court for guidance and picks up the slightest intimation of
an opinion. It does not matter whether the opinion of the trial
judge is conveyed to the jury directly or indirectly as every
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a trial before an
impartial judge and an unbiased jury. 17
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed a
conviction when the trial judge shook his head during defense counsel's
summation. 7 2 Finding that the judge did not intend to convey his
opinion on the merits of the case to the jury, the court nonetheless
reversed because the jury was "left to speculate" about what caused the
judge's actions.1 73 And the Appellate Court of Illinois found reversible
error when a trial judge "slammed down his pencil, heaved a sigh, and
made facial gestures in response to a question posed by defense counsel"
during his cross-examination of a prosecution witness.1 74 Finding that the
defendant "may have been prejudiced in the eyes of some or possibly all
of the jurors," the court reversed the conviction.171 Other courts have
taken notice that nonverbal conduct, including turning one's back to
counsel, making facial expressions or gestures, and tapping the bench
with a pen, can rise to the level of interference, intrusion, or influence in
the jury's fact-finding role. 76 At the heart of this entire line of cases is
the basic notion that the judge is the central and all-powerful player in
the trial and that, because of this fact, the jury will look for any signal at
all, whether intentional or inadvertent, conscious or subconscious, for
guidance on what to make of the case. As articulated by the Supreme
Court of Kansas:
170. Id. at 625.
171. Id. (quoting State v. Sidbury, 306 S.E.2d 844, 845 (N.C. 1983)).
172. Veal v. State, 268 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tenn. 1954).
173. Id.
174. People v. Mays, 544 N.E.2d 1264, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
175. Id. at 1272.
176. See Allen v. State, 276 So. 2d 583, 586 (Ala. 1973) (stating that "facial expressions,
gestures, and nonverbal communications which tended to ridicule defendant and his
counsel, could, standing alone, operate so as to destroy the fairness of a trial"); People v.
Harmon, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "partiality may be
shown by wordless conduct: a dismissive gesture, a look of disbelief, a bored closing of the
eyes, or certainly, by turning one's back to a speaker"); State v. Grant, 295 So. 2d 168, 173-
74 (La. 1973) (stating that a judge's tapping on the bench with a pen to accentuate a
particular jury instruction "could be considered as a prohibited comment upon the
evidence").
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"The trial judge occupies a high position. He presides over
the trial. The jury has great respect for him. They can be easily
influenced by the slightest suggestion coming from the court,
whether it be a nod of the head, a smile, a frown, or a spoken
word. It is therefore imperative that the trial judge shall
conduct himself with the utmost caution in order that the
unusual power he possesses shall not be abused."1"
In a different opinion, that same court put a further gloss on its
reasoning:
These admonitions are prompted by the truism that a jury has
a natural tendency to look to the trial judge for guidance, and
may find it even where it is not intended. The judge's attitude
and the result he supposedly desires may be inferred by the jury
from a look, a lifted eyebrow, an inflection of the voice-in
many cases without warrant in fact.
178
All of this is, of course, borne out by the psychological literature relating
to the way juries function. As will be developed in the next section of
this Article, the application of these principles strongly suggests that the
judicial appointment of the foreperson of the jury is an unwarranted and
unacceptable intrusion into the fact-finding province of the jury and,
therefore, a denial of the defendant's right to have the jury decide the
facts without judicial influence or intrusion.
IV. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT OF THE FOREPERSON AS A VIOLATION OF
THE RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY
A. Lessons from the Case Law
From a review of the case law outlined above, several core
propositions become evident. First, it has been universally recognized
that the trial judge is the controlling figure in the courtroom in every
respect, orchestrating all aspects of the proceedings from the moment a
juror enters the room until the moment he or she leaves it. Second,
because jurors generally feel at sea in the largely unfamiliar environment
of the courtroom, they look for and receive from the trial judge a series
of clues, both verbal and nonverbal, about how to behave, what to say
and do and, most importantly, what to believe. Third, essentially the
combined effect of the first two, these signals from the trial judge, even if
unintended, are likely to have a significant impact on the decision-
making process of any individual juror. Particularly because jurors tend
177. State v. Hamilton, 731 P.2d 863, 868 (Kan. 1987) (quoting State v. Wheat, 292 P.
793, 797 (Kan. 1930) (Jochems, J., dissenting)).
178. State v. Blake, 495 P.2d 905, 912 (Kan. 1972).
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to falsely assume that the trial judge is a truly neutral figure without
personal opinions and biases and that the trial judge's experience means
that the trial judge has superior wisdom or judgment about the facts of
the case, jurors are generally inclined -sometimes consciously,
sometimes without awareness-to do what they think the judge wants
them to do. And fourth, any "curative" instruction is likely to be largely
or completely ineffectual in this context. Using these propositions as a
backdrop, this section of the Article will analyze whether the mere
selection of the jury foreperson by the trial judge, in and of itself, can rise
to the level of improper influence or intrusion into the jury's exclusive
role as finders of fact.
The first proposition-that the trial judge is the central and controlling
figure in the courtroom-is so self-evident that it hardly needs support.
Professor Michael Pinard has summarized the situation particularly well:
The judge is the dominant figure in the courtroom. The jurors
are a captive audience from the moment they first step inside
the courtroom as they are, for the most part, either completely
inexperienced or marginally experienced in the trial process.
They are struck not only by the grandeur of the courtroom
setting, but also by the power and prestige possessed by the trial
judge.
Moreover, jurors are immediately and repeatedly instructed
that they must listen to the judge's each and every word, obey
the judge's rulings, and follow the judge's instructions. The
judge instructs the jurors as to how they are to behave during
the trial, including who they can communicate with about the
subject matter of the trial and when they can do so. The judge
tells the jurors the time they are to arrive at court, as well as
when they can leave. The judge also instructs the jurors about
which portions of the trial they can consider during the
deliberations, as well as the words and statements-usually in
the form of objections that were sustained-that they must
erase from their minds as if they were never uttered.
Accordingly, the judge is vested with extraordinary power and
control over the jury. Quite simply, the jury must do as the
judge says.19
Spun from the perspective of a trial judge, the scenario looks much the
same. As California Superior Court Judge LaDoris H. Cordell has
written:
The psychological exaltation of my role as judge is cleverly
reflected in my physical exaltation. My bench (my throne) is
179. Pinard, supra note 117, at 271-72 (footnotes omitted).
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several feet higher than the seats of the litigants, jurors, and
spectators. It is placed at the head of the room, dead center.
My unique status is enhanced by the black robe and the
appellation, "Your Honor." Within the confines of my
courtroom, surrounded by all of the accoutrements of power, I
am the supreme and ultimate voice.' 80
That the judge is the central and most powerful player in a trial
courtroom is beyond legitimate debate.
The second proposition-that jurors both consciously and
unconsciously look to the trial judge for clues about what to believe, and
that they invariably receive these clues-is well documented in the case
law and in the literature on jury behavior. As one commentator has
explained, when a person "is placed in an unfamiliar situation in which
he does not know how to behave," that person "tends to seek out the
most experienced person, watch how that person reacts, and then modify
his own behavior to agree with the experienced person's behavior. This
occurs in a courtroom since the jurors who are unfamiliar with legal
proceedings look to the judge for guidance.''
While the jurors are busy looking for clues from the trial judge, the
trial judge is invariably sending those clues, whether intentionally or
unintentionally. Trial judges, like all people, have biases, prejudices, and
pre-conceived notions about people and about certain issues. 11 As trials
proceed, trial judges cannot help but form opinions and viewpoints of
their own, whether they want to or not. As noted trial Judge Marvin E.
Frankel has acknowledged, "The jury is likely to discern hints, a point of
view, a suggested direction, even if none is intended and quite without
regard to the judge's efforts to modulate and minimize his role.', 8 3 This
situation is exacerbated by the fact that most trial judges were once trial
lawyers and are, therefore, conditioned by years of experience to marshal
evidence and draw out inferences to reach particular conclusions.
Because, as articulated by Judge Frankel, "qualities of detachment and
180. LaDoris H. Cordell & Florence 0. Keller, Pay No Attention to the Woman
Behind the Bench: Musings of a Trial Court Judge, 68 IND. L.J. 1199, 1204 (1993).
181. Elizabeth A. LeVan, Article, Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom:
Attorney Beware, 8 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 83, 84 (1984).
182. Professor Michael Pinard makes this point well:
For the most part, judges do not necessarily harbor such biases consciously.
Rather, these biases "are often subtle and unconscious." Moreover, judges are in
no way unique in harboring such biases and prejudices, as "there is considerable
commonsense evidence from our everyday experience to confirm that we all
harbor prejudiced attitudes that are kept from our consciousness."
Pinard, supra note 117, at 281 (footnotes omitted).
183. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1043 (1975).
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calm neutrality are not necessarily cultivated by long years of partisan
combat,"' 84 many trial judges struggle to remain truly impartial.
Moreover, most trial judges appear to believe that their job is not simply
to preside over the presentation of the case, but also to ensure that
"justice is done'' 85 or that the trial reaches the "right result."'86 For these
reasons, some trial judges may send signals to the jury on an entirely
conscious and intentional level. But undoubtedly the more pervasive and
pernicious reality is that judges are doing so unintentionally and without
any conscious awareness, primarily through nonverbal clues. Professor
Arthur F. Greenbaum has described the process in these terms:
All individuals, including judges in the courtroom, manifest
nonverbal behaviors. These behaviors, which studies find
account for approximately 60 to 65 percent of a person's total
communicative output, are particularly important in conveying
attitudes and emotions, either purposefully or unintentionally.
They occur as inherent parts of normal communication, largely
beyond the sender's conscious control. Even when an
individual wishes to hide his feelings, research indicates that
these feelings will escape through the nonverbal channel. 
s
8
And the social science evidence suggests that, just as signals can be sent
without conscious awareness, they are often received in precisely the• 188
same fashion.
In the literature relating to judicial influence over juries, this process of
sending and receiving signals, both consciously and without awareness, is
commonly explained by reference to the "expectation effect," which is
"one of the most well-established phenomena in social science."'' 89 In
recognition of the expectation effect, all legitimate social science
experiments are conducted in a "double blind" fashion, meaning that
neither the evaluator nor the subject knows whether or not the subject is
part of a control group. The research establishing the existence of the
expectation effect concluded that when the experimenter knew the
184. Id. at 1033.
185. See Saltzburg, supra note 48, at 8 (noting that many judges believe that they have
"a special responsibility" to "see that justice is done").
186. See Frankel, supra note 183, at 1035 (quoting DAVID W. PECK, THE
COMPLEMENT OF COURT AND COUNSEL 9 (1954)) (maintaining that "the sole objective
of the judge" is to "get at the truth and arrive at the right result").
187. Note, Judges' Nonverbal Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to Judicial Impartiality,
61 VA. L. REV. 1266, 1270-71 (1975) (footnotes omitted). Arthur F. Greenbaum, the
author of this student note, is now a full professor at Ohio State University's Moritz
College of Law.
188. Id. at 1273.
189. Id. at 1269. This phenomenon is sometimes also called the "experimenter bias
effect." Id.
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desired or expected outcome "the experimenter would often
unintentionally guide the subject in an effort to 'come out right' and that
he could succeed in doing so because the subject would unconsciously
search for and respond to that guidance."' g One commentator described
the process, as it plays out in a jury trial, in these terms:
When judges form beliefs about any aspect of the trial, such
as the guilt of the accused or the credibility of certain witnesses,
or harbor certain biases against the accused or the defense
witnesses, such beliefs and biases may color their behavior
consciously or unconsciously. These judges might then ask
questions or make comments consistent with those beliefs or
biases .... [T]hese beliefs "may be manifested either verbally
or nonverbally ... and can be reflected in a judge's comments
on evidence, responses to witness testimony, reactions to
counsels' actions, or in rulings on objections." These judges
may influence the trial proceeding in a manner that reflects
their expectations of the outcome. As a result, these judges'
preconceived biases or beliefs may improperly influence the
jury.19 1
One unhappy consequence of the expectation effect as it plays out in jury
trials is that our best efforts to preserve and protect jury independence
may be far less effective than we would like to believe. Empirical
research has strongly suggested that judges "'leak' their true underlying
beliefs or expectations about defendants' guilt or innocence through
subtle nonverbal cues. Intentional or unintentional, leakage may
influence trial outcome, although the judge may 'appear' to the jurors to
be impartial.',
192
The third broad proposition-the great influence that a trial judge
wields over the jury's decision-making processes-in many ways simply
follows from the first two. The magnitude of the trial judge's influence
over the jury "has been recognized since the days of Aristotle"'1 93 and is
190. Id.
191. Pinard, supra note 117, at 282 (second omission in original) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Peter David Blanck, Calibrating the Scales of Justice: Studying Judges' Behavior
in Bench Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1119, 1126 (1993)).
192. Peter David Blanck et al., Note, The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and
Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89, 130 (1985). The lead
author of this note, then a law student with a Ph.D. in psychology from Harvard
University, is now the Charles M. and Marion Kierscht Professor of Law at the University
of Iowa College of Law.
193. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Limits of Judicial Intervention in Criminal Trials and
Reversible Error, 11 GA. L. REV. 371, 378 & n.41 (1977).
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taken by appellate courts as an article of faith.' 94 The fact that even the
subtlest indication from a trial judge concerning his or her views or
expectations can have an undue influence on the jurors is generally
ascribed to the convergence of a number of factors. As just discussed,
jurors, like most people, respond to unfamiliar surroundings by looking
for clues about how to behave and what to think. Because the judge is
the authority figure and the figure with the most prestige in the
courtroom, jurors tend to look to the judge for those clues. Having
sought and then received those clues from the trial judge, jurors will do
their best to follow them, seeking to avoid the feeling that they have not
done their jobs properly or the feeling that they have somehow
disappointed the judge; jurors, like most people, aim to do a good job
and to please those in a position of authority.
Indeed, psychological studies "offer abundant support for the idea
that, for whatever set of reasons, modern man seems incurably
dependent upon being told what the 'correct' way to perform is."' 95 One
commentator, reminded of Milgram's famous experiment establishing
that "in a strange context even objectively immoral behavior may be
elicited by a legitimate authority figure," noted: "The analogy to the
judge, perhaps in his Solomonic role the most legitimate and
authoritative of all legitimate authority figures, is clear.', 196 Another has
said: "In the minds of the jurors, the judge is supreme. He can do no
wrong. Jurors seek to avoid the displeasure of the judge. They are
reluctant to decide questions of fact contrary to what they believe the
views of the judge to be."' 97 Again, the words of California Superior
Court Judge LaDoris A. Cordell seem particularly apt:
I no longer wonder about whether or not we judges influence
juries, but rather how much and in what way we influence them.
... The jury attends carefully to the judge, searching out each
of her behaviors and imbuing them with meaning. Under such
conditions, it is no wonder that jurors and judges agree on
verdicts seventy-five percent of the time. It is difficult to
imagine any other two bodies that would agree so well. The
layout of the courtroom, heightened sensitivity, and the wish to
194. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has taken "judicial notice" that "juries are highly
sensitive to every utterance by the trial judge." Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 983
(5th Cir. 1968).
195. Note, supra note 187, at 1276 n.56.
196. Id.
197. Leslie L. Conner, The Trial Judge, His Facial Expressions, Gestures and General
Demeanor- Their Effect on the Administration of Justice, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 175, 177
(1968).
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please that arises from positive transference may well account
for such blissful accord.
While much of this process-or at least the part of it that is without
awareness-is either difficult or impossible to control, it would seem
evident that mechanisms must be in place to reduce the risk of improper
judicial influence. One such mechanism, the so-called curative
instruction, is the subject of the fourth broad proposition.
The fourth proposition-that so-called curative instructions are largely
or completely ineffectual in this context-is as well accepted in the
trenches of the judicial system as it is supported by social science
research. 99 In the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson:
"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
fiction., 200 Most practicing judges appear to accept this reality as well;
Judge Cordell concluded her comments quoted above by observing the
truism that "no matter how much we may admonish them not to, jurors
do pay a great deal of attention to the person behind the bench."
20
1
In cases in which the trial judge's messages are either sent or received
without awareness, curative instructions simply cannot be effective. As
Professor Arthur Greenbaum has pointed out, because "the
communication often occurs without the conscious recognition of either
the sender or the receiver . . . it is difficult to imagine how a standard
instruction, one which directs a juror to disregard behavior he does not
realize occurred, would purge this influence process.20  Stated another
way, curative instructions "are powerless to remedy prejudice which the
juror receives unconsciously., 20 3 In situations where the juror is aware
that he or she has received certain clues from the judge, a curative
instruction is equally likely to be ineffective. This is particularly true
because psychological research reveals that "individuals tend to resolve
message conflicts between verbal and nonverbal channels in favor of the
latter. ' '2 4 If a juror perceives a conflict between nonverbal messages that
he or she has received from a judge and a conflicting curative instruction,
"the proclivity of individuals to rely more heavily on the nonverbal
198. Cordell & Keller, supra note 180, at 1207 (footnote omitted).
199. See Devine et al., supra note 29, at 666 (summarizing empirical research
establishing that curative instructions "have proven to be ineffective" because "jurors are
unwilling (or unable) to set aside information that appears to be relcvant to determining
what happened-regardless of what the law (and thus the judge) has to say about it").
200. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
201. Cordell & Keller, supra note 180, at 1207.
202. Note, supra note 187, at 1283 (footnotes omitted).
203. Id. at 1283-84 n.91.
204. Id. at 1283.
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messages in such a situation, [makes] it likely that the instruction will be
ineffective., 20 5  In fact, there is good reason to believe that in many
situations curative instructions can actually be counterproductive, serving
merely to highlight prejudicial information.a Presumably for these
reasons, the courts in many of the cases cited earlier in this Article have
reversed convictions when a jury is exposed to outside influence or
interference even in the face of a curative instruction from the judge. As
those courts have suggested, the key is to avoid the potentially
prejudicial conduct in the first place.
B. The Power of the Foreperson
In legal theory, the foreperson of a jury has no more power or
influence than any other member of the jury and plays an essentially
ministerial role, serving solely to maintain order in the deliberation
process and to act as the voice of the jury in the courtroom. In reality,
however, it is a widely accepted proposition in the legal and social
science literature that "[a]lmost invariably, the foreman of the jury exerts
considerable influence upon the outcome of the case. A foreman often
works to translate his viewpoint into the verdict, instead of acting as an
205. Id.
206. See Devine et al., supra note 29, at 666 (stating that the studies that have been
done on curative instructions suggest not only that they have "proven to be ineffective"
but also that they have "been associated with a paradoxical increase in the targeted
behavior"); Note, supra note 187, at 1284 n.91 (noting that "a curative instruction may in
some instances exacerbate the prejudice by reinforcing the cue in the juror's mind"). Most
trial lawyers recognize this phenomenon quite well, sometimes opting riot to request
curative or limiting instructions because of their fear of simply highlighting harmful or
prejudicial facts. See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND
PRACTICE 295 (2d ed. 1997) (advising trial lawyers that they "may occasionally want to
forego the limiting instruction, on the theory that it will only call attention to the harmful
evidence").
207. See, e.g., Burke v. Hodge, 97 N.E. 920, 922-23 (Mass. 1912) (noting that the
foreman "presides over the deliberations of the jury" and is "the legally recognized voice
of the jury," but that "his power is no greater than that of any juror"); People v. Rosa, 471
N.Y.S.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (acknowledging that "some forepersons may act as
leaders," but asserting that the "only function of the foreperson is the ceremonial duty of
acting as the jury's spokesperson," that the foreperson "has the same status as any other
juror," and that "the law recognizes no special status for the foreperson"). In federal
courts, jurors are commonly instructed that the foreperson will "preside over your
deliberations" and "speak for you here in court." See, e.g., 1 MODERN FEDERAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS TJ 9.05 cmt. (Leonard B. Sand et al. eds., 2004). Some academics have
proposed that the term "foreperson" be replaced in federal jury instructions with the term
"spokesperson" for fear that the foreperson "will be viewed as more important than the
other jurors" when the court's intent is that the foreperson should be "one among equals."
1 FED. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.66 & cmt. (Josephine R. Potuto et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1993).
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impartial chairman of the deliberations., 20 8  In presiding over the
deliberation process, a foreperson is required to exercise discretion and
control in a variety of ways:
In effect, he or she becomes chairman of the board, often
deciding who will be given the floor and for how long, when
notes will be sent to the court, when there has been enough
discussion of a topic, when a new topic should be discussed,
when votes will be taken, [and] whether votes will be by a show
of hands or by secret ballot ....29
Each of these decisions offers an opportunity for the foreperson to exert
influence, influence that may be exerted consciously or without
210
awareness.
Study after study shows that the foreperson of a jury will exert this
power to decide "who will be given the floor and for how long" by
participating in the deliberations more than any other juror, perhaps
nearly three times as much on average.2" Deliberation participation
rates are significant because research confirms that "jurors who speak
208. Philip J. Hermann, Predicting Personal Injury Verdicts and Damages, in 6 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 966, § 17 (1967); see also William Bevan et al., Jury Behavior as a Function of
the Prestige of the Foreman and the Nature of His Leadership, 7 J. PUB. L. 419, 436 (1958)
(finding that, in the dynamics of a deliberating jury, "group opinion reflects to a significant
degree the view of an effective leader"); Franklin J. Boster et al., An Information-
Processing Model of Jury Decision Making, 18 COMM. RES. 524, 541 (1991) (finding that
"the foreperson was a very influential group member" and that "the impact of the
foreperson relative to other jurors increased more than proportionally as jury size
increased"); Ray E. Moses, Scratching the Juror's Itch: Toward a Model of Fair
Deliberative Process, CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at 55, 55 (observing that "the foreperson has
disproportionate power and control" over the jury's decision-making processes); Lorrie L.
Luellig, Why J.E.B. v. T.B. Will Fail To Advance Equality: A Call for Discrimination in
Jury Selection, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 403, 431 (1995) (observing that the "foreperson
plays a crucial role in determining the verdict"); Marder, supra note 31, at 595 (observing
that the "foreperson can play a critical role in leading the jury to a verdict").
209. Moses, supra note 208; see also John F, Manzo, Taking Turns and Taking Sides:
Opening Scenes from Two Jury Deliberations, 59 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 107, 108 (1996)
(finding that "jury forepersons exert considerable influence on the shape of jury
deliberations, including the organization of turn taking").
210. See Note, supra note 187, at 1297. Interestingly, many of the same dynamics that
apply in the context of a juror seeking and following signals from a judge may also apply in
the context of a juror seeking and following signals from the foreperson. As Professor
Greenbaum has noted, "[T]he juror in a trial ... has more than one authority figure to
which he may turn for subtle suggestions. The advocates and even the jury foreman may
exert considerable influence over a juror during the course of the trial." Id. Since
research shows that juries, when left to elect a foreperson, will most often select higher
status males, and often those with prior jury experience, Devine et al., supra note 29, at
696, these dynamics may be quite powerful.
211. See Moses, supra note 208; Devine et al., supra note 29, at 696; Marder, supra
note 31, at 595.
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the most are viewed as the most persuasive by their peers. Even when
the foreperson purports to be merely summarizing points raised by other
jurors, he or she "is still selecting which comments to emphasize, and
consequently, exerting influence on the discussion."2"3 Common sense
and common experience tell us that an individual with even a moderate
level of savvy and sophistication has the skills to control group dynamics,
and frequently group decisions, through the use of these techniques.
A significant body of social science research supports these and other
conclusions about how and how much the foreperson can influence the
deliberation processes of a jury. Even if, as the commonly accepted
research indicates, that juries in as many as nine out of ten cases reach a
verdict that was preferred by the majority prior to the start of
214deliberations, that would still leave an extremely large number of trials
where the outcome "will necessarily hinge on the deliberation process."2 5
A comprehensive review of the social science literature on jury
deliberations has concluded that the deliberation style adopted by the
jury, which in turn is selected and controlled largely by the foreperson,
may be one of the strongest factors in determining whether the eventual
jury verdict will be different from the initial inclinations of the
majority."' For example, when the jury deliberates with a "verdict-
driven" style, meaning that it votes early and then focuses its discussion
around the verdict, the minority may have less of an opportunity to
prevail than when the jury deliberates with an "evidence-driven" style in
which an initial vote is deferred until after a systematic evaluation of the
evidence. 217 In part, this is because the verdict-driven style sometimes





A foreperson can also exert significant influence over the tenor and
the direction of the deliberations by his or her selection of polling
procedures. Several studies conclude that changes in juror voting can be
influenced not only by the timing of the vote but also by the public or
secret nature of the vote.2 9 Anyone who has ever presided over a group
responsible for making a decision recognizes that the taking of a vote at a
212. Marder, supra note 31, at 596.
213. Id. n.13; see also Manzo, supra note 209, at 122 (observing that "the privilege of
summarizing" allows a foreperson "retrospectively to define the extent of agreement or
disagreement among the jurors").
214. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966);
Devine et al., supra note 29, at 690, 701.
215. Devine et al., supra note 29, at 701.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 693, 701.
218. Marder, supra note 31, at 602.
219. Devine et al., supra note 29, at 694.
2005]
Catholic University Law Review
moment when the momentum seems to be moving in a certain direction
can irretrievably alter the outcome. When a vote is public and sequential
in nature, research confirms our common human experience: people
have an inherent tendency to change their votes in order to be in accord
with the views of the majority.2 20 Thus, forepersons can exert influence
through their "ability to call for opinion polls at key moments and/or
create local majorities by starting the poll with jurors known to have
preferences in accord with their own."2 ' Indeed, research suggests that,
when the strength of the evidence is moderate or when verdict
preferences are fairly evenly divided, "the manner in which polls are
conducted could have a substantial impact on the final verdict, especially
the first poll."
22
The bottom line in all of this is that two core concepts appear to be
beyond contradiction: that judges can exert substantial and
disproportionate influence over juries, whether or not they intend to do
so, and that the forepersons can exert substantial and disproportionate
influence over those same juries, whether or not they intend to do so.
The next step in the analysis of the impact of the judicial appointment of
the foreperson is to consider these two concepts together.
C. The Significance of the Judge's Appointment of the Foreperson
Because we know that, for a variety of reasons, jurors will "discern
hints, a point of view, a suggested direction, even if none is intended and
quite without regard to the judge's efforts to modulate and minimize his
role, 23 it is quite safe to assume that jurors will draw meaning from the
trial judge's nonrandom selection of one of their own to serve as
foreperson. Whether or not they are correct, the jurors are likely to
believe that the judicially appointed foreperson is viewed by the judge as
in some way superior to the other jurors and, therefore, entitled to more
respect and more deference to his or her views. 4 The jurors may
speculate that the foreperson was appointed because his or her beliefs
appear to be in accord with those of the judge, or at least that the judge
thought so. The jurors may speculate that the foreperson was appointed
because he or she holds a particular form of status-perhaps prior jury
220. Id. at 694-95.
221. Id. at 698.
222. Id. at 701.
223. Frankel, supra note 183, at 1043.
224. This is precisely the logic adopted by the court in Dorshkind v. Harry N. Koff
Agency, 134 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), which struck down as unconstitutional the
judicial appointment of the jury foreperson because it "constitutes an inherent danger to
the inviolateness of the jury system," id. at 347. For a more thorough discussion of
Dorshkind, see infra notes 263-76 and accompanying text.
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service, educational level, race, gender, or social class-that merited
appointment as the foreperson. In any event, by nonrandomly
appointing the foreperson of the jury, the trial judge effectively enters
the jury room and interferes with and influences the deliberative process
by designating one juror as superior to the rest and by placing that juror
in a position of power and influence.
This process may take place in several different ways, each fraught
with its own problems. In many cases, there is good reason to believe
that a trial judge will consciously appoint as a foreperson a juror that the
judge believes is likely to share his or her verdict preference.225 While
this sort of selection can carry with it a somewhat benign explanation-
that the trial judge is simply trying to see that "justice is done" -it is, of
course, a textbook example of the judge violating the defendant's
constitutional right to have a jury find the facts of the case without
outside interference or influence. Interestingly, the specter of this
behavior appears in several of the very few cases in which an objection to
judicial appointment of the foreperson has been litigated. In the early
226
case of Bryan v. State, for example, the trial court appointed as
foreperson a juror who had apparently been seated for the trial over a
227 221
series of defense objections. Similarly, in United States v. Cannon,
the trial court appointed as foreperson a juror that the defendant
maintained "had shown 'distinct hostility' toward defense counsel during
the course of the trial. '29 This same process can occur, of course, on an
unconscious level, much in the way that an experimenter who desires a
certain result can unconsciously act in ways that influence the behavior of
his or her subject. In cases such as United States v. Martin,23 ° in which the
trial judge appointed the foreperson of the jury after openly declaring in
a bench conference that he believed the defendant to be guilty, 23 ' the
likelihood of such behavior would appear to be quite high.
Those trial judges that appoint the foreperson in a nonrandom fashion
must settle upon some criteria for selection, even if they have not done
225. Other institutional players can have the same objectives. See Moses, supra note
208, at 56 (observing that the courtroom bailiff, by giving written instructions to a
particular juror, can effectively nominate that juror as foreperson and that the bailiff
"usually wants to nominate a juror whom he perceives as pro-prosecution").
226. 260 S.W. 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1924).
227. Id. at 847.
228. 903 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1990).
229. Id. at 856-57.
230. 740 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1984).
231. Id. at 1361. Amazingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction in
this case even after it was confirmed at a hearing after remand that one juror had actually
heard the judge's remark. United States v. Martin, 757 F.2d 770, 770-71 (6th Cir. 1985)
(per curiam).
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so consciously. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many judges use
entirely subjective observations to inform their selections. As noted
earlier, one U.S. magistrate judge has explained that the person he
appoints is "usually someone whom I have observed paying attention to
the evidence, instructions and opening and closing arguments of
counsel. ,2" Another trial judge has stated that he "chose a person to be
foreman who, in my opinion, appeared to be most attentive during the
evidence, and in the deliberations is most able to keep the jury in line
with the complicated issues. ' '213 Some judges make the appointment at
234 al
the outset of the trial, presumably on the basis of visual information or
of information disclosed during the jury selection process. 35 One distinct
possibility is that a trial judge will appoint a member of the jury who has
prior jury experience; this particular selection criterion is problematic for
criminal defendants in light of social science research suggesting that
"experienced jurors tend to be somewhat more pro-conviction and
influential than inexperienced jurors.",1
36
These entirely subjective selection criteria readily lend themselves to
all forms of bias and prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious. Even
an endeavor as ostensibly straight-forward as identifying the juror who
"appeared to be most attentive" is, of course, laden with a variety of
cultural biases, as not every culture displays attentiveness in the same
fashion. Social science research establishes that juries, when permitted
to elect their own forepersons, will most often select a juror who is better
educated, holds a higher status job, or comes from a higher social or
economic class.237  Women are notoriously underrepresented as
forepersons.23' Because judges, like the rest of us, have biases and
232. MCLE, DISTRICT COURT SPEAKS, supra note 15, § 3.2, at 229 (quoting U.S.
Magistrate Judge Charles B. Swartwood of the District of Massachusetts).
233. Dorshkind v. Harry N. Koff Agency, 134 Cal. Rptr. 344, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting California Superior Court Judge Raymond R. Roberts).
234. See supra note 23.
235. See Schwarzer, supra note 24 (observing that some judges "designate the
foreperson ... on the basis of the information disclosed during voir dire").
236. Devine et al., supra note 29, at 677.
237. Id. at 696 (summarizing social science research); Marder, supra note 31, at 595 n.9
(citing studies finding that those from the "higher classes" are overrepresented among
forepersons, that businessmen had a four times better chance of being elected foreperson
than male laborers, and that housewives were "never selected"). Interestingly, there is
some evidence suggesting that, in a criminal case, "the higher the status of the individual
juror the more likely he [is] to vote guilty." John P. Read, Jury Deliberations, Voting, and
Verdict Trends, 45 Sw. SOC. SCI. Q. 361, 366 (1965).
238. See Devine et al., supra note 29, at 696 (summarizing social science research
establishing tendency of the jury to select males); Luelling, supra note 209, at 431 (citing a
study in which "women constituted 36% of the jurors but only 3% of the forepersons");
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prejudices of their own, there is no good reason to believe that these
biases and prejudices are not fully brought to bear in the judicial
selection of forepersons. After all, most judges probably believe that
they would be highly effective forepersons, fully capable of leading the
jury to the right decision. If this is so, then those judges are most
probably searching, on either a conscious or an unconscious level, for the
juror who is most like them. And since white, upper-class males continue
to constitute a majority of judges in the United States, the cycle of bias
and prejudice continues, but this time at the hands of the judge and not
the jury. While it may be troubling to recognize that juries frequently act
upon their own biases and prejudices, the important point, at least in this
regard, is that they are doing so without outside influence or
interference.
Even if a judge, on a conscious level, tries to even out the imbalances
caused by bias and prejudice by selecting women, racial or ethnic
minorities, or others who would be underrepresented if juries were
permitted to elect their own forepersons, the result is still an intentional
judicial distortion of the deliberative process. A number of U.S.
Supreme Court cases, either directly or through implication,
acknowledge the truth that the race or gender of a juror may make a
significant difference in the deliberative process. As early as 1880, the
Court in Strauder v. West Virginia239 recognized that it was "well known
that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the community"
and that those prejudices can "sway the judgment of jurors., 241 More
than a century later, in his concurring opinion in Georgia v. McCollum,
241
Justice Clarence Thomas made this observation about those words:
I do not think that this basic premise of Strauder has become
obsolete. The public, in general, continues to believe that the
makeup of juries can matter in certain instances. Consider, for
example, how the press reports criminal trials. Major
newspapers regularly note the number of whites and blacks that
sit on juries in important cases. Their editors apparently
recognize that conscious and unconscious prejudice persists in
our society and that it may influence some juries. Common
242
experience and common sense confirm this understanding.
Marder, supra note 31, at 595 & n.9 (citing studies establishing underrepresentation of
women as forepersons).
239. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
240. Id. at 309.
241. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
242. Id. at 61 (Thomas, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also United States v.
Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting the potential importance of the
race of a juror in the following terms: "To suggest that a particular race is unfit to judge in
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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissenting in the same case, wrote that it
is "by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the
way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at
their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence. '43 She
explained that "the outcome of a minority defendant's trial may turn on
the misconceptions or biases of white jurors. ''2  Consequently, the
judicial selection of a white foreperson or of a black foreperson can, in
certain circumstances, have an enormous impact on the outcome of a
particular criminal case. Whether the selection may be viewed as
favoring or disfavoring a criminal defendant is really of little matter, as
the point is that the mere selection may significantly interfere with and
influence the jury's deliberative process.
Justice O'Connor has written in equally definitive terms that, when it
comes to the deliberative process of a jury, "like race, gender matters" :245
A plethora of studies make clear that in rape cases, for example,
female jurors are somewhat more likely to vote to convict than
male jurors. Moreover, though there have been no similarly
definitive studies regarding, for example, sexual harassment,
child custody, or spousal or child abuse, one need not be a sexist
to share the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and
resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of
the case. "Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box
and leave behind all that their human experience has taught
them." Individuals are not expected to ignore as jurors what
they know as men-or women.... [Tihe import of our holding
[that it is unconstitutional to exercise peremptory challenges
based solely upon gender] is that any correlation between a
juror's gender and attitudes is irrelevant as a matter of
constitutional law. But to say that gender makes no difference
as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no difference
as a matter of fact.246
Indeed, at least one commentator has explicitly suggested that a judge, in
selecting a foreperson, "should make sure that women are well
represented over time" because a female foreperson "serves as a role
model, thus creating a setting in which other women ... become more
any case necessarily is racially insulting. To suggest that each race may have its own
special concerns, or even may tend to favor its own, is not.").
243. McLollurn, 505 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
245. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
246. Id. at 148-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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outspoken and assertive. ' '21 Whether or not the purpose is a noble one,
the end result is the intentional manipulation of the jury's deliberative
process, the very sort of outside interference and influence that is
prohibited by law.
There is one other feature of the judicial appointment of the
foreperson that merits particular focus. In some jurisdictions, or in some
cases within certain jurisdictions, the foreperson is appointed in advance
of the designation of the alternate jurors, thereby assuring that the
judge's selected juror will not be discharged from serving on the jury. In
Massachusetts, for example, that sequence of events is actually required
by statute. The relevant section of the Massachusetts General Laws
provides:
If at the time of the final submission of the case by the court to
the jury more than twelve members of the jury who have heard
the whole case are alive and not incapacitated or disqualified,
the court shall direct the clerk to place the names of all of the
remaining jurors, except the foreman, in a box and draw the
names of a sufficient number to reduce the jury to twelve
members.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has rejected a constitutional
challenge to the provisions of this rule, noting only that it did not "think
it important that the foreman was not subject to discharge. 2 49  The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire has likewise upheld the
constitutionality of having the trial judge appoint the foreperson of the
jury prior to randomly selecting the alternate jurors, thereby exempting
that juror from discharge. In neither of these opinions did the court
directly address the relationship between the composition of the jury and
its deliberative process.
One need not be a very imaginative thinker to envision a case in which
a well-intentioned trial judge selects as foreperson the only female juror,
the only juror of color, or the only juror holding some other identifiable
status. By assuring that that particular juror remains on the jury, the
judge has influenced the deliberations that will follow. Indeed, any
action by a judge that has an impact on the ultimate composition of the
jury will, by definition, alter and influence the deliberative process.
247. Marder, supra note 31, at 609-10.
248. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234, § 26B (2000) (emphasis added).
249. See Commonwealth v. Bellino, 71 N.E.2d 411, 416 (Mass. 1947); see also
Commonwealth v. Paiva, 453 N.E.2d 469, 471-72 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (relying on Bellino
to deny the same claim).
250. See State v. Jaroma, 630 A.2d 1173, 1177 (N.H. 1993).
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D. Case Law Analyzing the Constitutional Claim
Litigation concerning the constitutionality of the practice of allowing a
trial judge to appoint a jury foreperson has been sparse indeed, and
actual legal analysis of constitutional claims has been even sparser.251 In
several of the very few published opinions in which the propriety of
judicial appointment of the foreperson is raised, the courts have
dispatched with defense objections to the practice with nothing more
than an indication that the claim is "without merit., 252  In others, the
courts have discussed the merits of the claim solely in relation to a
statutory challenge 2s or avoided analysis altogether by finding that the
claim was not preserved for review. In the end, there appear to be only
two published cases in which the constitutional magnitude of the issue is
analyzed in any detail.
In State v. Jaroma,25 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire decided a
case in which the defendant argued that the trial judge's nonrandom
appointment of the foreperson of the jury denied his "State and federal
251. This author has not been able to locate a single law review article raising the issue
and has identified only a dozen published cases in which any sort of challenge to the
practice of judicial selection of the foreperson issue is even mentioned.
252. See United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 956 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bartelho, No. CRIM 95-29-P-
H, 2000 WL 761787, at *1 (D. Me. Jan. 3, 2000); see also United States v. Cannon, 903 F.2d
849, 856-57 (lst Cir. 1990) (noting simply, and without further analysis or explanation, that
"there is no valid reason to prohibit a trial judge from appointing the foreperson").
253. See State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582, 599-600 (Me. 1976) (rejecting the defendant's
claim that election of the foreperson by the jurors themselves was statutorily mandated);
Bryan v. State, 260 S.W. 846, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1924) (finding that the trial judge's
appointment of the foreperson of the jury was a violation of the Code of Criminal
Procedure). In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 474 N.E.2d 1062 (Mass. 1985), the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts resolved a case in which the opposite claim was made-
that the judge erred by not appointing a foreperson- solely by reference to the governing
statute, id. at 1067.
254. See Maynard v. Readdick, 196 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that
the claim that "the trial jury has the exclusive prerogative of selecting its own foreman"
was not preserved for appeal); Fitzwater v. State, 469 A.2d 909, 915 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1984) (citing court rule requiring judicial appointment and holding that claim that
appointment invaded the province of the jury was not preserved for appeal); Ballenger v.
State, 667 So. 2d 1242, 1258-59 (Miss. 1995) (noting the defendant's argument that judicial
appointment of the foreperson "impermissibly endorsed" that juror's views and gave his
views "a greater influence on the jury than those of a foreperson selected by the jury
itself" and advising future trial judges not to appoint the jury foreperson, but holding that
the issue was waived by the lack of a timely objection); Gazaway v. State, 708 So. 2d 1385,
1387 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (acknowledging that it was error for the trial court to appoint
the foreperson, but refusing to address the issue because it was not properly preserved for
review); see also Machor, 879 F.2d at 956 (rejecting claim that judicial appointment of the
foreperson was error, noting that no objection was raised at trial).
255. 630 A.2d 1173 (N.H. 1993).
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rights to an impartial jury, and thus a fair trial., 256 The court noted that
the defendant also made "a fleeting reference to a purported denial of
his State and federal due process rights," but because the defendant did
not "distinguish his due process claims from those involving his right to
an impartial jury and a fair trial," the court did not reach them.15' At the
trial, the judge, over the defendant's objection, "nonrandomly selected
juror number four to be the jury foreperson prior to choosing the
alternate through random selection., 25 9 In overruling the defendant's
objection at the trial level, the trial judge noted that he had "'designated
the foreperson"' in '"virtually every criminal case [he had] tried in the
last year and a half.' ,259 At least as far as the opinion revealed, the judge
offered no reason for his having done so.
The supreme court's analysis of the defendant's constitutional claim,
which was confined to one paragraph, pointed out that juror number
four, like all the other jurors, had been properly qualified for jury service
and had been seated as a juror without defense objection.6 While the
court's opinion clarified what the defendant had not argued-he had not
argued that juror number four was biased-it provided no information
whatsoever about what specific arguments had been advanced either
before the trial judge or on appeal and what support, if any, had been
256. Id. at 1177.
257. Id. In fact, for many of the reasons explored in this Article, a compelling
argument can be made that the judicial appointment of the foreperson is, or at least can
appear to be, an act of partiality toward one party or the other, thereby violating a
defendant's due process right to be tried by a fair and impartial judge. While the right to a
trial before a fair and impartial judge, unlike the right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury,
does not appear explicitly in the U.S. Constitution, that right has long been recognized as a
fundamental aspect of due process of law as provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). The right encompasses a broad interpretation of
what it means for a judge to be partial to one side and can be violated not only by actual
partiality on the part of the trial judge, but also by the appearance of such partiality. See
Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. Moreover, the right to a trial before a fair and impartial judge
is considered so fundamental that any violation of the right will lead to automatic reversal
without recourse to harmless error review. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8
(1967) (including the right to an impartial judge in a list of rights the violation of which
requires automatic reversal); see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986) (noting that
harmless error analysis "presupposes a trial, at which the defendant, represented by
counsel, may present evidence and argument before an impartial judge and jury").
Because the claim that judicial appointment violates the right to an impartial judge is in
large part reliant on precisely the same arguments advanced in this Article concerning the
right to an impartial jury, I will make no further attempt here to distinguish between the
two constitutional claims.
258. Jaroma, 630 A.2d at 1177.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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offered for those arguments. 61 With that one contention clarified, the
court ruled as follows:
"Therefore, the right to trial by an impartial jury secured by...
the New Hampshire Constitution is not directly implicated in
this case." The defendant has failed to demonstrate that the
court's action rises to the level of a constitutional violation or
that he was prejudiced by the selection. Absent a finding of
262prejudice in this case, we will not reverse.
The court did not address the ramifications of the judicial appointment
itself, nor did it clarify how a defendant might ever prove actual
prejudice in this setting.
By contrast, the California Court of Appeal in Dorshkind v. Harry N.
Koff Agency, Inc."' engaged in a thorough analysis of the constitutional
ramifications of the judicial act of selecting a foreperson. In that case, at
the close of his charge to the jury, the trial judge appointed a specific
juror to be foreperson. 4 When counsel questioned the propriety of the
judge's actions, the judge explained his choice in these terms:
'In this case I have done it because, in my opinion, there are
complicated issues here, and I chose a person to be foreman
who, in my opinion, appeared to be most attentive during the
evidence, and in the deliberations is most able to keep the jury
in line with the complicated issues, and I do it purely on a
subjective analysis because I think that the popularity contest
sometimes indulged in does a disservice to everyone involved,
so all of you have voiced your opposition and exception.
2 11
On appeal, the defendants argued that the judge's action deprived them
of their constitutional right to a trial by jury.26 Noting that it could find
no relevant authority directly on point, the appellate court noted that it
was nonetheless "not persuaded that the appointment of a jury foreman
is either unimportant or that it is properly a subject of judicial
discretion. ,261
The court began its analysis by highlighting the historical and
constitutional importance of the right to trial by jury and, more
specifically, the right to "unbiased and unprejudiced jurors," which it
described as "an inseparable and inalienable part of the right to trial by
261. Id.
262. Id. (citations omitted).
263. 134 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
264. Id. at 344-45.
265. Id. at 345.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 346.
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jury guaranteed by the Constitution., 26  Emphasizing the lengths to
which trial courts go to instruct the jury not to read any sort of opinion
into anything the judge has said or done, the court explained the logic
compelling that instruction:
It is well understood by most trial judges that it is of the utmost
importance that the trial judge not communicate in any manner
to the jury the judge's opinions on the case submitted to the
jury, because juries tend to attach inflated importance to any
such communication, even when the judge has no intention
whatever of influencing a jury's determination. 69
The court recognized the significant possibility that the mere designation
by the judge of one juror as foreperson, with nothing more, may be
imbued with meaning, even if unintended by the judge:
If the trial judge is free to select the foreman of the jury, there
will undoubtedly be some jurors who feel a certain amount of
deference is due to the opinion of the person selected by the
trial judge, regardless of the other instructions routinely given,
which remind the jury that each juror has the right and the
responsibility to arrive at his or her free choice in the matter at
hand, without being influenced by any conduct-verbal or
210
nonverbal-from the trial judge.
Moreover, the court recognized that the selection of the foreperson can
have a genuine impact on the manner and nature of a jury's
deliberations; indeed, the court concluded that the trial judge's remarks
in this particular case, suggesting that he selected the person he thought
was "most able to keep the jury in line," indicated "a deliberate intention
by the trial judge to influence the deliberations of the jury., 27' Finding
that the judicial selection of the foreperson "constitutes an inherent
danger to the inviolateness of the jury system," the court held that the
California Constitution's guarantee of the right to trial by jury requires
that a jury be permitted to select its own foreperson. 2 Furthermore, the
court "adopt[ed] the premise that selection by a trial judge of the jury
foreman constitutes reversible error without reference to proof of actual
prejudice." 73 Although this groundbreaking case happened to involve
268. Id. at 346-47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Weathers v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 485 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Cal. 1971)).
269. Id. at 347.
270. Id.
271. Id. (emphasis omitted),
272. Id.
273. Id. at 348.
20051
Catholic University Law Review
civil litigation, subsequent California cases have applied the court's
holding in the criminal context.
7 4
While the California Court of Appeal purported to be analyzing the
right to trial by jury found in the California Constitution, the same
reasoning can and should be applied to the same right found in the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. And that court, for some of the
reasons that it articulated as well as for others that it did not address,
reached the right conclusion. The nonrandom selection and appointment
of a foreperson by the trial judge, in and of itself, carries with it a host of
possibilities for the judge to exercise improper influence on the jury's
deliberative process, whether intended or not. Indeed, it would seem
impossible to imagine any scenario under which the deliberative process
would not be influenced by the appointment, for even if the same person
were to have been elected by the jurors themselves, the mere fact of the
appointment has independent significance.
The court correctly recognized the overwhelming power and influence
wielded by the trial judge. The court also correctly recognized the reality
that judges will send and jurors will receive messages about the judge's
opinions, whether or not on a conscious level, and that this process is
exacerbated by the sometimes desperate need and desire on the part of
any individual juror to be guided in his or her deliberations. In addition,
the court correctly recognized the power of the foreperson to control the
manner of the jury's deliberations. And most importantly, the court
correctly recognized the danger that at least some jurors will feel that the
opinions of the judicially appointed foreperson are entitled to some form
of deference. The source of this deference could be the view that the
judge had particular respect for this one juror or for his or her
intelligence or judgment, that the judge suspected that this juror's views
were likely to be in accord with those of the judge, or that the
foreperson, merely on the basis of title, is entitled to some form of
deference. Indeed, the source of the deference could be a combination
of all of these factors. In any event, the designation by the trial judge of
what may in effect be one "super-juror" seemed to be at the core of the
court's concern.
One other feature of the court's opinion targeted the most critical issue
in the constitutional analysis: any conscious effort on the part of a trial
judge to influence the deliberative process-even if the judge's sole
intent is to make the process more efficient, more orderly, or more
egalitarian-is a blatant violation of the defendant's right to have a fair
and impartial jury deliberate and decide facts without the influence of
the trial judge. This logic suggests, of course, that the judicial
274. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 260 Cal. Rptr. 474, 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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appointment of a foreperson is a violation of the defendant's rights even
if the judge is actually trying to assist the defendant. The well-
intentioned judge who is simply trying to move a case toward a verdict or
who is trying to make sure that women and minorities are well
represented over time is acting as much in contravention of the
defendant's rights as the judge who intentionally selects the juror he or
she perceives as most pro-prosecution.
Two other issues, not mentioned in the Dorshkind court's analysis, are
equally important in analyzing the constitutional claim. First, there is the
issue of whether the judge's appointment of the foreperson exempts that
juror from designation as an alternate juror. It is presumably the case, as
highlighted by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Jaroma, that all
of the jurors, on an individual basis, have at that stage been found to be
impartial.21- Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine a serious debate about
whether changing the actual composition of the jury would have an
impact on the deliberative process. And the impact on the deliberative
process comes in this instance, of course, from the trial judge, who has
had played a significant role, in an intentional fashion, in forming the
ultimate composition of the jury. Once again, the motivations of the trial
judge would seem to be completely irrelevant to the core constitutional
analysis; the intentional manipulation of the process by which alternates
are selected from the pool of jurors, with whatever motivations in mind,
constitutes the intentional exercise of influence over the deliberative
process.
The second and more central issue is the impact of the social science
concept of the "expectation effect." As noted earlier, the expectation
effect is "one of the most well-established phenomena in social
science. ' ' 176 It is simply blinking reality not to recognize that the trial
judge, whether before the trial begins or as the trial proceeds, holds
personal opinions about the merits of the case. Even if one assumes that
the judge, acting in good faith, does everything in his or her power to
mask those opinions, it once again blinks reality not to recognize that
those opinions will be leaked to the jurors in a variety of ways. It seems
virtually every social scientist would agree that the trial judge is likely to
behave in ways that are designed to lead to the verdict that he or she
believes is right, whether he or she does so consciously or without
awareness. Allowing the trial judge to appoint the foreperson in a
nonrandom fashion is nothing less than an open invitation for the judge
to steer the jury toward a particular verdict, in plain contravention of the
defendant's constitutional rights.
275. State v. Jaroma, 630 A.2d 1173, 1177 (N.H. 1993).
276. Note, supra note 187, at 1269.
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V. CONCLUSION
The practice of either requiring or allowing a trial judge to make a
nonrandom appointment of one juror as foreperson, apparently quite
widespread in at least certain parts of the country, plainly implicates a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have a fair and impartial
jury deliberate, decide the facts of the case, and reach a verdict without
outside influence from the trial judge. For a variety of reasons explored
in this Article, the practice must be abandoned because it constitutes a
violation of that right. The few justifications for the practice that can be
identified are heavily outweighed by the requirement that the right to
trial by a fair and impartial jury be scrupulously observed for, as the
Supreme Court recently observed, "the jury right [can] be lost not only
by gross denial, but by erosion." '277
The trial judge is, by all accounts, the central and most powerful figure
in any trial. Jurors look to the trial judge for all sorts of information
about how to behave, in part because they are told to do so from the
moment they enter the courtroom, and in part because they, like all
people, respond to unfamiliar surroundings by searching out the most
prominent authority figure and following that figure's leads. Trial
judges, like the rest of us, hold opinions of their own, some formed on
the basis of facts and evidence, some formed on the basis of biases and
prejudices. And trial judges, like the rest of us, will convey those
opinions in a variety of ways, verbal and nonverbal, consciously and
without awareness. All of this happens in every trial, no matter what we
may do to try to stop it, but if there is to be any pretense of observing the
defendant's right to be tried by a jury that is free from the influence of
the trial judge, it is clear that we must adopt practices that help minimize
the judge's improper influence over the jury and prohibit practices that
increase the probability and severity of that influence.
The judicial appointment of the foreperson of the jury falls into the
category of practices that increase the probability and severity of judicial
influence over the jury's deliberative process. Whether intended or not,
the mere appointment of one particular juror over another is bound to be
imbued with meaning by the jury. The judge's stamp of approval must
mean something, whether it be that the judge perceives this juror as wiser
in some way or as having views that are more likely to be in accord with
those of the judge. Whatever meaning the jury gives to the appointment,
it is a factor that would not exist were the jury left to elect its own leader.
When the judge appoints the foreperson in a fashion that exempts that
juror from designation as an alternate juror, the judge is altering the
composition and, therefore, the deliberative process of the jury. But
277. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999).
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even when the appointment is timed in such a way that the composition
of the jury is not effected, the judicial appointment of the foreperson can
have a significant influence on the deliberative process because the
foreperson controls the manner and style of deliberations, which social
science research tells us can sometimes be outcome determinative. The
choice of who should hold such a powerful position within the jury
should belong to the jury itself, not to the trial judge. The judicial
appointment of the foreperson has the potential to change not only who
will hold the power of the foreperson, but also the level of power that
that person may wield, as the already significant power of the foreperson
is in all likelihood magnified by the mere fact of his or her appointment
by the judge.
The judge's decision to appoint in a nonrandom fashion one particular
juror to serve as foreperson must, by definition, be based upon one or
more reasons, whether or not the judge can consciously articulate them.
Some of these reasons are easy to categorize as improper reasons, such as
racism, sexism, elitism, or the deliberate intent to influence the verdict in
one direction or another. But even reasons that might in some way be
viewed as either positive or benign, such as countering racism, sexism or
elitism, or seeking to make the deliberative process fairer, more orderly
or more efficient, are impossible to reconcile with our jurisprudence
concerning the right to have a fair and impartial jury deliberate, decide
the facts of the case, and reach a verdict without outside influence from
the trial judge.
The impact of these various forms of judicial influence over the
deliberative process is unknown and unknowable in any given case.
Even if one were permitted to poll the jurors after the fact, such a polling
process would be of little avail in most instances. Many jurors would be
completely unaware of the myriad ways in which their own opinions or
the deliberative process as a whole may have been altered by these
dynamics, from whether a different foreperson would have made a
difference to whether, even had the same foreperson been elected by the
jury, the process was changed by the mere fact of the judicial
appointment. Since much of the danger connected to the judge's
influence lurks beneath the surface of conscious behavior, it is essentially
impossible to assess. It is precisely for these reasons that any attempt to
resolve the issue with a curative instruction is doomed to failure, and any
effort after the fact to engage in some form of harmless error analysis
would be futile and meaningless. A verdict rendered by a jury that is no
longer impartial because it is no longer free from the outside influence of
the trial judge is inherently tainted, calling into question the integrity of
the entire proceeding.
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To the extent that the practice of requiring or allowing a trial judge to
appoint the foreperson of a jury is a developing trend in jury
management, it must be reversed. To the extent that it is simply a
reflection of past practice in certain jurisdictions, it must be stopped.
The time has come for courts to recognize the practice for what it is: a
blatant and unjustifiable violation of the Sixth Amendment right to be
tried before a jury that is free from the outside influence of the trial
judge.
